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This thesis makes the case for a Wittgensteinian account of phenomenal concepts, both in exegetical and 
justificatory terms. In terms of exegesis, I respond to critics who argue that Wittgenstein’s so-called 
Private Language Argument (hereafter ‘PLA’) is incompatible with the existence of phenomenal concepts. 
In terms of justification, I offer a proposal for how to positively characterise phenomenal concepts in a 
way in which Wittgenstein might have endorsed. My proposal contrasts with other recent attempts to do 
so.  
 
My argument is in four parts:  
 
Part I introduces phenomenal concepts by way of their development out of materialist responses to 
Jackson’s (1982) version of the Knowledge Argument. I provide my own attempted definition for how to 
understand the term ‘phenomenal concept’.  
 
Part II discusses Balog’s (2009) and Papineau’s (2002, 2011) criticism that the PLA is incompatible with 
phenomenal concepts. I reject this criticism on four grounds, arguing that it fails both as a criticism in 
itself, and as truly representing a proto-Wittgensteinian account of phenomenal concepts.  
 
Part III discusses externalist interpretations of the PLA (Child, 2011, forthcoming, Hacker, 1993a, 1993b, 
Pears, 2008). I reject externalism on three grounds, where the uniting theme is the idea that we can make 
sense of phenomenal concepts in detachment from external circumstance without all loss of meaning. 
 
Part IV is more positive. I make the case for a Wittgensteinian reading of phenomenal concepts where 
the crucial feature is ‘the feeling/sensation itself’. It is not its relation to external counterparts. This makes 
room for an alternative reading of the point of the PLA. Under my reading, the ‘logically private’ 
sensation is not one that lacks an external counterpart, but one which lacks any connection to any other 
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This essay is concerned with making the case for three chief claims:  
 
(a) The criticism that Wittgenstein’s so-called Private Language Argument (hereafter ‘PLA’) is 
incompatible with the existence of phenomenal concepts is to be rejected.  
 
(b) The externalist attempt to positively define a Wittgensteinian approach to phenomenal concepts 
is to be rejected. I argue that externalism itself has serious flaws and also that Wittgenstein was 
not an externalist. 
 
(c) An alternative proposal about the real target of the PLA is offered, specifying a new way of 
understanding what does and what does not count as logically private. 
 
 
The structure of the argument runs as follows:  
 
Part I introduces phenomenal concepts by way of their development out of materialist responses to 
Jackson’s (1982) version of the Knowledge Argument. I also define how I will be employing the term 
‘phenomenal concept’ throughout the essay.  
 
Part II is concerned with providing a detailed response to the recent criticism of the PLA as presented by 
Balog (2009) and particularly Papineau (2002, 2011). The criticism argues that the PLA is incompatible 
with the existence of phenomenal concepts, and that this is ‘bad news’ for Wittgenstein because there are 
such concepts. This criticism is supposedly backed up by a version of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. 
This criticism is rejected on four fronts: 
 
(i) I argue that the example used to support the Knowledge Argument is inadequate; Marianna’s 
formation of a phenomenal concept is due to more than just acquaintance. Furthermore, if 





(ii) Balog and Papineau are wrong in interpreting the PLA as expressing a ‘public check’ approach to 
concepts.  
 
(iii) It is mistaken to think that the PLA is incompatible with phenomenal concepts in the first place; 
this is to conflate two senses of privacy. Wittgenstein is not an opponent of phenomenal 
concepts.  
 
(iv) The previous responses are negatively oriented, they suggest why Wittgenstein might not be 
opposed to phenomenal concepts. But we can be more positive than this. Child (forthcoming) 
argues that a version of Knowledge Argument can be naturally developed from commitments 
Wittgenstein expresses elsewhere, suggesting that Wittgenstein would readily allow for 
phenomenal concepts. I agree with this view, and argue that if we permit a broader 
understanding of phenomenal concepts than is usual in the literature, then we can draw further 
textual evidence supporting a Wittgensteinian rendering of phenomenal concepts. 
 
 
Part III discusses various externalist interpretations of the PLA (Child, 2011, forthcoming, Hacker, 1993a, 
1993b, Pears, 2008). Child’s argument is of particular interest in its explicit attempt to defend the view 
that phenomenal concepts must be ‘tied to external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour’ in order to 
be meaningful. I reject this externalism on three fronts. The uniting theme behind these objections is the 
idea that we can make sense of phenomenal concepts in detachment from external circumstance without 
thereby losing all meaning. 
 
In Part IV, I suggest that the above objections to the externalist interpretation should not trouble the 
Wittgensteinian because Wittgenstein was not a committed externalist. In contrast to many 
interpretations, I argue that it is sensation S, not unexpressible pain sensations, which represents the first 
genuine instance of a logically private concept in Philosophical Investigations. This view suggests the PLA is 
aimed at a different target than is typically argued for. Moreover, it suggests a different understanding of 
what counts as non-logically private. Private sensations are not precluded by the community’s inability to 
access them directly, or by their lack of connection with external behaviour. On the contrary, I argue that 









PART I: Background and definitions 
 
Before proceeding with the main arguments of this essay, it is necessary to provide some background and 
define some key terms. 
 
The current debates surrounding phenomenal concepts have their origins in a set of responses to 
materialism, stretching back at least as far as the 1970s (Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? (1974) 
might be earmarked as the starting point for such responses). Materialism is here broadly defined as the 
view that the world’s ontology, including the ontology of mental states, can be fully accounted for by a 
fundamental physics. This view has come under criticism from many quarters, but the overriding 
complaint is the same: Materialism, it is argued, is incapable of accounting for what has been variously 
termed as, e.g., the ‘‘what it is like’ character’, the ‘phenomenal character’, the ‘subjective character’, or the 
‘qualitative character’ of consciousness: 
 
...the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is 
something it is like to be that organism. ... fundamentally an organism has conscious 
mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism — something it 
is like for the organism (Nagel, 1974, p.436)  
 
We may describe the phenomenal character as the way that experience feels to the experiencer. There is 
‘something it is like’ to taste a cool beer on a hot summers day, and this feels different to ‘what it is like’ 
to drink a hot coffee on a cold winters night. It feels different to see a bright red expanse as opposed to a 
pale blue one. And what it is like to be a bat is probably very different from what it is like to be Queen 
Elizabeth II. The important point to emphasise here is that for all these examples, their phenomenal 
character seems to reveal a property which is essential to consciousness; we couldn’t have the 
consciousness without its possessing phenomenal character. There is no such thing as nonphenomenal 
forms of consciousness. It is the existence of this phenomenal character which, it is argued, prevents 
materialism from providing a full account of the world’s ontology. 
 
To be clear, the objection to materialism is not about whether material conditions play a part in explaining 
the existence of phenomenal character. On this point most materialists and non-materialists are in 
agreement.1 Rather, the objection denies only that such explanation ‘exhausts their analysis’ (ibid. p.437). 
This thought is expressed by Joseph Levine (1983), who argues that any physical explanation of 
experience leaves an ‘explanatory gap’ between it and the phenomenal character of experience. That is, 
for all that we might have discovered about the workings of C-fibre firings in relation to the physical 
                                                          
1 Barring eliminativist materialists, who deny that the term ‘phenomenal character’ has any place within an 
acceptable ontology (see e.g. Churchland (1986) and Stich (1983)). 
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bases of pain, ‘there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally “fit” the 
phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some other set of phenomenal properties ... 
the connection between it and what we identify it with [is left] completely mysterious’ (ibid. p.357). That 
is, C-fibre firing does little to explain why pain feels the way it does, instead of its feeling some other way, 
or no way at all.  
 
In similar vein, Frank Jackson’s (1982) version of the Knowledge Argument is used to support the 
conclusion that whilst someone might know all the physical facts about consciousness, they may yet be 
ignorant of all the facts about consciousness. Specifically, they might remain ignorant of the phenomenal 
character through which objects and experiences are represented and conceptualised in consciousness. To 
substantiate this argument, Jackson illustrates with the now familiar fictional example of Mary. Mary is a 
brilliant colour scientist, so brilliant that she comes to know all physical facts about colour vision. 
However, Mary has been imprisoned within a black and white room her entire life and so has never 
experienced colour herself. When she is finally released from her room and presented with her first non-
black or white colour, let’s say it is a red rose, Mary seems to learn something new about the world, 
specifically about its visual appearance. She learns that the visual appearance of red consists of a particular 
kind of phenomenal property, a property of which she was ignorant before her release. She learns ‘what it 
is like’ to see red. Accepting that complete physical knowledge does not mean that Mary has complete 
knowledge, it follows that physical facts are not the only facts. Therefore, materialism is false. Or so the 
argument runs. 
 
Whilst defining phenomenal character in any detail has proved divisive,2 there has reached a certain level 
of consensus over some key issues. There is near consensus that the Knowledge Argument is successful 
in demonstrating, at a minimum, that Mary attains new knowledge after her first acquaintance with new 
visual experiences.3 Agreement has also been largely reached regarding the premise that this new 
knowledge counts as genuinely propositional in form, over and above any new practical ability Mary might 
acquire.4 A significant proportion of discussion has now led to asking whether this new propositional 
knowledge counts as new knowledge at the level of reference or at the level of concepts (or sense). The term 
‘phenomenal concept’ arose out of an attempt by some materialists to suggest that Mary’s new knowledge 
is restricted to the conceptual level, and does not interfere with the metaphysical (see e.g. Loar, 1990, 
Lycan, 1990, Tye, 1995, Perry, 2001, Papineau, 2002, chapter 2). Relating to Mary, this materialist 
response accepts that Mary learns something new when she sees red for the first time, but denies that this 
                                                          
2 Crane (2000) has persuasively argued that the term ‘qualia’ (essentially what I term as ‘phenomenal character’) lacks 
a uniform meaning. Sometimes, it refers to supposed properties of the objects of experience (i.e. sense-data), 
sometimes to supposed properties of experiences themselves, and often the use equivocates between the two. 
Unfortunately, I cannot go into this argument in more detail. 
3 Although see Dennett (2007) who presents an interesting argument to suggest that if Mary has all physical 
knowledge, then she will already know all there is to know prior to exiting. 
4 Although see Nemirow (2006) for continuing disagreement. 
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new knowledge requires the recognition of a distinct ontological property. Just as we learn something new 
when we learn for the first time that Clark Kent is, in fact, Superman, so too Mary learns something new 
when she sees red for the first time. In both cases, the subjects gain a new way of thinking about 
Superman or about redness, and in this sense gain new concepts. But this doesn’t mean they are now 
referring to an additional property. Rather, they are referring to the same (material) property as before, but in 
a new way, under a new guise.  
 
One professed advantage of this version of materialism (a ‘Type-B materialism’ (Chalmers, 1996) or 
‘Phenomenal Concept Strategy’ approach (Stoljar, 2005)) is its frank admission that phenomenal character 
cannot be derived a priori from physical or functional explanation. Instead, the explanation is determined 
a posteriori; the identity is discovered as a result of scientifically-informed empirical investigation. So we 
should be surprised at how it turned out that phenomenal character is identical with being in a given 
physical or functional state. There are no conceptual entailments between neurobiological descriptions of 
brain states and phenomenal character. And so it is quite possible to conceive phenomenal character 
without brain activity and brain activity without phenomenal character. The Type-B materialist can 
seemingly accept that Mary makes genuine epistemic progress, whilst also retaining the intuition that the 
physical world is exhaustive of what there is. For the Type-B materialist, Mary’s progress is conceptual, not 
ontological. Most commentators now accept that there are such phenomenal concepts.5 The shift of 
attention has now turned to whether phenomenal concepts do in fact lead us towards such materialist 
conclusions, or whether, as Chalmers, puts it: ‘no account of phenomenal concepts is both powerful 
enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness and tame enough to be explained 
in physical terms’ (2010, p.306, also see ibid. chapter 10). 
 
Although the term phenomenal concept initially arose out of these metaphysical debates, the metaphysics 
of phenomenal concepts is not of direct concern for my purposes in this essay. Insomuch as it is possible, 
I therefore remain neutral on the metaphysics.6 My interest instead revolves around what logical and 
epistemological conditions phenomenal concepts must satisfy in order to count as genuine concepts, and 
whether or not they do in fact satisfy them.  
 
To start, it is helpful to specify phenomenal concepts in at least their broad outline. Daniel Stoljar 
succinctly describes a phenomenal concept as:  
 
...a concept of a specific type of perceptual or sensory experience where the notion of 
experience is understood phenomenologically (2005, p.269)  
 
                                                          
5 Although see Ball (2009) and Tye (2009). 
6 To discuss the metaphysics in any detail would probably amount to double the present word count. 
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Whilst this statement certainly requires elaboration, it does provide a neat summary: a phenomenal 
concept is a concept of the phenomenological character of the experience. Phenomenal concepts characterise 
the specifically qualitative, subjective, phenomenal features of experience. This much is clear. However, 
similarly to discussion about phenomenal character, many proposals have been offered to define the term 
‘phenomenal concept’ in more detail. And, again, when it comes to the specifics of exposition, the details 
lead to a variety of divergent positions. Most accounts of phenomenal concepts say that it includes 
features such as that the concept is essentially first-personal, whose content is directly accessible only to 
the subject. It is accepted that phenomenal concepts are acquired (typically) through acquaintance with 
the experience. Most accept that the experience is often of finer grain than the concept, and that the 
concept is often incorrigibly applied when used to directly refer to ones present experiences (see Balog, 
2009, pp.299-300 for a more comprehensive breakdown). More controversially, phenomenal concepts are 
variously regarded as recognitional concepts (Loar, 1990), indexical concepts (Perry, 2001), perceptual 
concepts (Papineau, 2002, 2006), sui generis concepts (Chalmers, 2003).  
 
With slim hope for providing an all-encompassing definition of this term, I will not pretend to do so. In 
its place is my own way of formulating matters. I take a broadly Wittgensteinian starting point by 
suggesting that a complete theory of concepts (of concepts in general, not just phenomenal concepts) must 
be capable of providing an accurate account of at least the following two conditions: 
  
Formation conditions:  The conditions under which we can be said to acquire the concept, i.e. how we 
came by that concept in the first place. (See e.g. Philosophical Investigations §§1-33)  
 
Application conditions: The conditions under which employment of that concept is rightly or wrongly 
determined; i.e. what constraints govern the use of the concept. (See e.g. 
Philosophical Investigations §§185-242) 
 
According to these conditions, one must be able (in principle) to explain how acquisition of the 
prospective concept is achieved, and how the concept gets used correctly in practice. The suggestion is 
that these conditions provide a sensible platform from which to understand particular instances of the 
supposed concept.7 
                                                          
7 In thinking about why my reader should be persuaded to accept this way of formulating matters, I cannot in all 
honesty provide a particularly clear answer. I was then pleased to read a neat passage in Peacocke’s A Study of 
Concepts (1992): 
 
Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, early and late, Quine, and recent realists and antirealists have all carried 
through projects of that general description. While agreeing on little else, all these thinkers are 
committed to holding that without a general treatment of concepts one will not have a satisfying 
philosophy ... The general form sets a standard to which accounts of particular concepts must 




To apply these conditions to task, then, we might ask what constitutes the formation conditions and 
application conditions governing phenomenal concepts. One response might be as follows: The 
distinctness of phenomenal concepts is partly a result of the fact that they are (typically) available only to 
those who have been directly acquainted with the requisite phenomenal experience(s). It is only 
acquaintance with that experience which determines consequent use―in virtue of having the experience, 
one can use and misuse the concept. In short: 
 
PC formation conditions: Acquaintance with experience is (typically) necessary for forming the concept. 
 
PC application conditions: Rules for use are determined solely in virtue of that acquaintance. 
 
In this manner PC application conditions are dependent on PC formation conditions. Part II will introduce a 
more detailed discussion of these conditions, and pose the question as to whether such conditions are in 
violation of a Wittgensteinian approach to concepts, or whether there is an acceptably Wittgensteinian 
presentation of phenomenal concepts in light of them. 
 
To make two final asides; the term ‘(typically)’ will be frequently expressed in the initial part of this essay 
(as it has been so far) to indicate a caveat that is intended throughout. The caveat is this: The possession 
of a phenomenal concept will typically be acquired by means of one’s having first been acquainted with the 
appropriate phenomenal particular(s). As some philosophers draw attention to, whilst this is in fact how 
phenomenal concepts are acquired, it does not mean that phenomenal concepts are of necessity acquired in 
that way. According to Conee (1994, p.140) and Peacocke (2009, p.188), one may grasp a phenomenal 
concept without having actually experienced the phenomenal character oneself―one may interpolate, as 
presumably Hume’s imaginer of the missing shade of blue would do. Or, more bizarrely, one might be 
duplicated, memories and all, and so have the phenomenal concept without having had the experience 
itself (see Dennett’s example of Swamp Mary (2007, pp.24-5)). Even so, the vast majority of instances of 
phenomenal concepts arise in this way; acquaintance with the experience is thus the ‘typical’ way 
phenomenal concepts are acquired. 
 
Final aside; Wittgenstein never used the term ‘phenomenal concept’, the term was not invented until 
recently. The closest term (arguably) is ‘sensation concept’, at least if we are considering the way in which 
‘phenomenal concepts’ are typically understood in the literature. For the purposes of this essay, the terms 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
genuine thought, it must also be by appeal to properties of this general form that such claims are 
justified. (p.vi) 
 
This passage chimes with my own sentiments about methodological priority. 
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are being treated synonymously, except for when discussing examples where the difference is indicated. 




PART II: Wittgenstein, opponent of phenomenal concepts? 
 
 
The Private Language Argument 
 
The term ‘Private Language Argument’ was not used by Wittgenstein, and it would be mistaken to think 
that there is just one argument provided in the relevant sections of Philosophical Investigations, §§243-315.8 
As one commentator puts it: ‘the texts in which the [PLA] is developed present a running battle against 
Private Language rather than a single engagement’ (Pears, 2006, p.37). Indeed, a brief reading of these 
sections shows that Wittgenstein not only presents many arguments against the possibility of a private 
language (see e.g. Schroeder, 2006, pp.201-215), but that a whole range of other philosophical issues are 
introduced as well. The ‘argument’ does not extend from premises to conclusion in linear form, as per the 
typical requirements of modern academic philosophy. Rather, the sections proceed via a barrage of 
strange thought-experiments. The reader is presented with a variety of situations where language and 
concepts function in ways very different to our own, where the environment itself is somehow different, 
where there are talking pots, stones that feel pain, babies that feign pleasure, and of course we are 
introduced to the infamous speaker of the private language.9 We are repeatedly encouraged to compare 
and contrast these language-games to our own (as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130)). Conclusions are 
rarely, if ever, explicitly drawn, or the thoughts summarised to help the reader collate the ideas. For better 
or worse, this was Wittgenstein’s preferred style:  
 
[M]y thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against 
their natural inclination.—And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the 
investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every 
direction (PI, preface ix) 
 
Of course, in the same passage Wittgenstein also admits to ‘not liking [his] writing to spare other people 
the trouble of thinking’ (PI, preface xe). Given this ‘wide field of thought’, it is inevitable that commentators 
                                                          
8 Hereafter, I use ‘PI’ when referring to sections in Philosophical Investigations. I use similar acronyms for references to 
Wittgenstein’s work, as set out in the bibliography. 




pick up on different strands of thinking, emphasise different themes, and provide very different 
reconstructions regarding the ultimate points and purposes of the PLA.  
 
Fortunately, the introduction of the PLA is a somewhat more straightforward matter: 
 
A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; 
he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who 
spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.An 
explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their 
language into ours. ... 
 
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal 
expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private 
use?Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The 
individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person 
speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the 
language. (PI §243) 
 
We are first asked to consider cases where we talk to ourselves in different ways. A relatively humdrum 
thought experiment. Next is to imagine a community where people only talk to themselves; slightly more 
bizarre, but not beyond the realms of imagination (after all, the imagined explorer can do it). Finally, we 
are asked to think about a quite different question: Can we imagine a language where a person can write 
or talk about their private inner experiences? This is the fundamental question of the passage, and indeed of 
the PLA as a whole. It should not be understated. However, just what this question is getting at only 
becomes more apparent from the ensuing dialogue between Wittgenstein and his assumed interlocutor. 
The interlocutor is puzzled, thinking that Wittgenstein is asking him to imagine something which we 
actually do all the time― namely, write down or talk about our inner feelings and moods. The interlocutor 
assumes that Wittgenstein is restating something similar to the first question posed. Wittgenstein’s 
response to this puzzlement is central to the PLA; it is here that the PLA is clarified and defined. The 
interlocutor’s assumption is not what Wittgenstein means at all. Rather, the language is imaginary, where 
the ‘individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to 
his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language’ (emphasis added). 
The language is not one like ours, because in this imagined language the words refer only to immediate 




Unfortunately (or ‘interestingly’ depending on your persuasion), just what this all means, Wittgenstein 
never quite seems to spell out. In one sense, the target of this section is relatively clear; it is asking 
whether there can be a private sensation language, a language which refers to private sensations, sensations 
which cannot be understood by anybody else. This purported language is set in contrast with our ordinary 
language. And the following sections revolve around the discussion and rejection of the idea that there 
could be such a language. However, in another sense, we are instead taken deeper into the rabbit hole. 
For we are led to ask: What, then, could these logically private inner experiences/ sensations be? What is 
a private language? What is it that makes this language different from ours? What is wrong with it? Who 
thinks that there is one? What is the philosophical significance of these reflections? The content of the 
PLA revolves around the dialogue between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor over just these kinds of 
questions. Commentators have disagreed ever since. 
 
The bulk of the remainder of this essay is concerned with discussing those interpretations of the PLA 
which have been canvassed in view of the recently discussed topic of phenomenal concepts. Specifically, I 
respond to the objection that the PLA is incompatible with phenomenal concepts (this makes up Part II), 






Katalin Balog (2009) and David Papineau (2002, 2011) have recently criticised the PLA for its alleged 
incompatibility with the existence of phenomenal concepts. The objection can be stated in three relatively 
straightforward steps. In the first step, it is suggested that the point of the PLA is to show that concepts 
must meet certain constraints in relation to their possibility for public scrutiny prior to meaningful 
employment. (The ‘priority’ claim here is stated explicitly by Papineau (see his 2002, p.129, 2011, pp.181-
2). As per Balog: 
 
Wittgenstein, in his famous private language argument, argues that for a term (concept) to 
have meaning (or reference) it must be possible to intersubjectively check whether an 
application of that term is correct (2009, p.298) 
 
As per Papineau: 
 
...the main point of the private language argument is to make it clear that private terms ... 






In the second step, it is argued to be an essential feature of phenomenal concepts that their acquisition 
and exercise occurs strictly within the private domain: the subject ‘breathe[s] meaning into her term purely 
by focusing inwards and attaching it to her current experience’ (ibid. p.181). So it is (typically) through 
acquaintance with the experience that determines the meaning of the concept, and only thereafter that 
one ascribes that meaning publically.  
 
On the basis of these first two steps, the proposed incompatibility between the PLA and phenomenal 
concepts is evident: the PLA states that the acquisition and exercise of concepts must be susceptible to 
public scrutiny. Phenomenal concepts are purportedly formed and exercised independently of such 
scrutiny.  
 
At the third step, Papineau argues that a successful variant of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, as 
involving Marianna (Nida-Rümelin (1996)), proves there to be distinct phenomenal concepts. In 
conclusion, the PLA is not only incompatible with phenomenal concepts, but such incompatibility is 
ultimately ‘bad for Wittgenstein’ (Papineau, 2011, p.175). Or so the objection runs. 
 
Given its centrality to the argument, it is worth considering the Marianna example in more detail. In the 
case of Mary, there is some ambiguity about how to explain what Mary believes when she is released from 
her room and thinks “Ah, so that’s a red rose.” To clarify; suppose Mary is unwittingly presented with an 
imitation blue rose, under the pretence that it is red. Under one reading, Mary believes that the rose is 
blue-coloured―she sees the blue-coloured rose, assumes her colour experiences are similar to others, and 
so forms the belief that roses are that colour, i.e. blue. However, this is problematic because if Mary is 
asked what colour the rose is, she will surely say that it is a red-coloured rose; so we might also be inclined 
to say Mary believes she sees a red-coloured rose. It is not immediately clear that Mary learns ‘what it is 
like to see red’ simply in virtue of exiting the room, even in cases where there is no such trickery 
involved.10  
 
Nida-Rümelin (1996, pp.221-5) introduces an example which aims to dispel the ambiguity surrounding 
Mary’s belief by distilling the singularly phenomenal element of what Mary believes apart from anything 
which may confuse issues. Unlike Mary, Marianna is shown a coloured piece of paper and isn’t told the 
name of the colour she is looking at. So Marianna isn’t able to infer the name of the colour on the basis 
of its shape, or the sort of object she is presented with. Marianna is not expected to form any beliefs 
regarding the name of the colour, beyond those arrived at through mere guesswork. And yet we can 
                                                          
10 We might envisage the subject landing herself in similar sorts of puzzles as Kripke’s Pierre, seemingly both liking 
and disliking the colour red (see Kripke, 1979). 
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envisage Marianna coining a concept to refer to the colour of the experience that she just saw. Moreover, 
she is not only capable of coining a concept, ‘but can classify it visually, and can re-create it in visual 
imagination’ (Papineau, 2002, p.108, also see ibid. p.128 and his 2011, pp.176-7). That is, she can now 
perform such cognitive tasks as recognise new particular instances of it when she sees it again, and she 
can imagine it being the colour of the sky, or the colour of the sun, and so forth.11 None of which she 
could do before her encounter. 
 
These considerations lead Papineau to state why Marianna acts as a counter-example to the PLA:  
 
Marianna isn’t just thinking about subjective states with the help of her imaginative and 
introspective powers. She coined a special term Φ to refer to a type of experience. And this 
term definitely seems to have two features that Wittgenstein took to discredit the idea of a 
‘private’ language: first, Marianna is supposed to have breathed meaning into her term purely 
by focusing inwards and attaching it to her current experience; second, the term so formed 
will be one whose meaning will be incommunicable to anyone except Marianna herself. 
(2011, pp.180-181) 
 
Crucially, Marianna is able to both acquire and exercise such concepts solely in virtue of being acquainted with 
the experience. Furthermore, Marianna will be capable of forming this concept even though she is incapable 
of communicating to anyone else about the experience her newly coined concept refers to (see Papineau, 







In what follows, I reject Papineau’s claim about the following two purportedly anti-Wittgensteinian 
features of Marianna’s situation:  
 
(i)  Marianna’s ability to ‘breathe meaning’ into a concept solely through acquaintance. 
(ii)  Mariana’s ability to do so without being able to communicate what she means to others.  
 
The main point of objection is that Papineau is wrong to think Marianna’s situation represents an 
objection to a Wittgensteinian approach to concepts. In my view, Wittgenstein is no opponent of 
                                                          
11 Unlike the puzzle of Kripke’s Pierre, which (as per the previous footnote) troubles Mary so, Marianna might 
evade these troubles insofar as her belief is squarely attached to *that* experience, whatever it is called.   
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phenomenal concepts and Marianna presents no objection to a Wittgensteinian understanding of such 
concepts. In what follows, I give three arguments in support of this claim:  
 
(a) Wittgenstein persuasively rejects the idea that a concept can be formed through 
‘acquaintance alone.’ So the Marianna counter-example fails if it is used to defend this idea. I 
suggest that this need not lead to a rejection of phenomenal concepts outright, but rather 
points towards the need for a revision of how we understand their origins. 
 
(b) I briefly restate the common response to a Kripkean interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ‘public 
check’ or ‘community’ view of rule-following.  
 
(c) I reject the idea that Wittgenstein would object to the kind of incommunicability that 
Marianna is faced with; Marianna’s privacy is contingent and therefore not the target of the 
PLA.  
 
If the dialectic of argument is on track, there is so far no reason why Wittgenstein cannot account for the 
existence of phenomenal concepts. The subject of Parts III and IV will go on to suggest what kind of 






In a lecture delivered in 1934, Wittgenstein gives an example of a theory of meaning opposed to his own: 
 
The following case seems to contradict the claim that the use of a word does not follow from 
the idea: by an example, i.e., by an ostensive definition, we are able to give a person an idea 
of red, say. We show him the meaning of the word “red”. If we can give the meaning by 
ostensive definition, then the correct use will follow from its meaning and not from the rules. 
The correct use of the word “red” is thought of as a consequence of its meaning, which is 
given in one act, all at once. (AWL, p.87) 
 
The central idea is clearly put: correct use will follow from the meaning. The idea is recognisably anti-
Wittgensteinian (or Augustinian, PI §§1-33) in its attempt to divorce meaning from use. In this context, 
‘meaning’ must be intended in the sense of ‘bedeutung’ and so more closely with the English word 
‘reference’. The bedeutung is provided as a result of successful ostensive definition. Ostensive definition is 
itself defined as the act of explaining the meaning of a word, typically by successfully pointing out, 
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ostending, the relevant object or experience (i.e. the referent) to the receptive observer. In the example 
above, it is in virtue of having an example of red pointed out that one acquires the concept red, and 
thereby (following from) learns how to use it correctly. In slogan-form: Use follows meaning. 
 
Papineau defends Marianna as representing a case in favour of just this kind of theory: 
 
Since [Marianna] clearly can think good thoughts with her new concept, say I, it follows that 
normative rules are inessential to representational content ... Content does not derive from 
normative rules, but rather from the kind of non-normative natural facts invoked by causal 
or teleosemantic theories of representation. In so far as there are norms in the area of 
judgement, these follow from the prior constitution of content, and are not a precondition 
thereof ... it is no deficiency in [Marianna’s] concept that she is not sensitive  to any 
normative principles tying its use to public criteria (2002, pp.128-9. Also see his 1999).  
 
My aim in what follows is to defend Wittgenstein by suggesting why Marianna does not count as a good 
example of someone who is ‘not sensitive to any normative principles’. On the contrary, Marianna is well 
primed to think those kinds of thoughts precisely because she is a part of the right normative 
environment.   
 
Wittgenstein’s immediate response to the acquaintance-based view in the lecture quoted above is as 
follows: 
 
However, note that the use of the word is not actually fixed by giving someone, by ostensive 
definition, what is supposedly the meaning. For he may now use “red” when he sees a 
square. (AWL, p.87) 
 
Wittgenstein’s quipped response here seems to be that even in a supposedly straightforward case where 
ostensive definition is used to determine the concept ‘red’, it is possible to imagine that the subject fails to 
do so, or does so in unusual fashion. The point is not (pace Kripke (1982, see response 2 below)) a 
sceptical one, namely that ‘there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word’ (ibid. p.55). 
Rather, the point seems to be that, so far as we are limited to thinking about the sequence of acquaintance 
contact, there is nothing to suppose that the ostensive definition means the shape of the object instead of 
the colour, or perhaps only red-coloured squares. We might even imagine the problems beginning further 
back, where one may be perennially disposed to follow the tip of the finger up towards the arm, not from 
arm to fingertip, like a cat (PI §185). Again, the main point is that there is nothing in the act of ostensive 
definition that of itself entails meaning will be secured, or secured in the way we expect. As famously 




An ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case. PI§28 
 
In another lecture, Wittgenstein develops this thought: 
 
If I showed a person a red sample and asked him to bring me something red, he would do 
so. But he need not. He might bring me something having the complementary colour, 
though this is not usual. One use is not more direct than another―only more usual. We are 
extraordinarily affected by the way in which we do in fact react to a sign. The result is that 
certain ideas stand to us for certain uses because that is how we usually apply them. We 
therefore think that those ideas have that most usual use in them, though they could 
perfectly well be imagined to have another use (AWL, pp.88-9) 
 
I take these remarks to be expressing, at least in part, the idea that a philosophical understanding of 
meaning, of understanding how people come to know how to use concepts and so forth, must involve 
consideration of features beyond the act of acquaintance. That is, it must involve recognition of the 
deeper web of supporting features which contribute towards explaining the role of concepts in our lives. 
Even the act of pointing out or gesturing towards objects to signify what a concept refers to is itself an 
action saturated with normative significance, not an independent explanation of it (PI §16). As such, if we 
wish to explain how meaning arises, we need to extend beyond the act itself, and situate it in its broader 
normative context: 
 
What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing 
now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background 
against which we see any action. Z §567 
 
This approach rejects the idea that we can explain meaning by beginning with our acquaintance with 
objects or experiences and then branching out, but from the fact that we are situated in a normative 
environment which is amenable to such acquisition and application in the first place. These 
considerations are not used to deny the role of ostensive definition in practice, or deny that one can go on 
to use a concept in virtue of being shown a sample. Acquaintance is important ((typically) necessary), but 
only when it is situated in the right environment: ‘an ostensive definition explains the use―the 
meaning―of a word when the overall role of the word in language is clear’ (PI §30, also see PI §§31-32). 
The criticism, then, is squarely that the acquaintance-based view fails to pay heed to the complexity of the 




Dialectically speaking, we reach loggerheads. Papineau says acquaintance explains concept acquisition, 
Wittgenstein says it doesn’t. One way to move the argument forward is to specify an example where the 
conditions for ostensive definition are in place, but where the ‘normative rules’ are altered or, as much as 
possible, removed from the scenario altogether. I take such an example to be a continuance of the Mary 
thought-experiments: Just as Papineau objects to the original Mary thought-experiment for failing to 
disentangle alternative explanations about the content of Mary’s belief, we might levy similar charges 
against Marianna. If the acquaintance-based view is right, if ‘normative rules are inessential to 
representational content’, then Marianna’s normative education aids only to confuse the essential facts 
about her concept acquisition, which is achieved through ‘acquaintance alone.’ And if this is so, then we 
should be able to reconceive changes to Marianna’s education, but without affecting those essential facts. 
That is, if Marianna can be shown to form a new concept under such conditions, then Papineau’s 
conclusion that ‘acquaintance alone’ suffices to elicit the formation of a new concept gains substantial 
plausibility. However, if such changes to the normative rules impact negatively on Marianna’s ability to 
form such concepts, then this indicates that Marianna never ‘breathed meaning into her term purely by 
focusing inwards and attaching it to her current experience’; there is always more to say.12  
 
Before reimagining the Marianna example, it is important to highlight those factors which, from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective, seem to make Marianna a good candidate for forming phenomenal concepts, 
but which have little to do with the overt act of ostensive definition. There are features such as the fact 
that Marianna possesses a colour vocabulary, and is aware that certain objects are coloured in ways that 
that vocabulary aims to represent. She is aware of which objects are typically associated with which 
colours, by name at least. There is the fact that colours themselves are relatively stable, although subject 
to some variation through differing lighting conditions, and Marianna is aware of this. Marianna has also 
grown up with an education and in a culture which pays significant attention to colours. She will know 
that seeing a coloured piece of paper will give her no indication about the phenomenal character of the 
colour she sees. We might even imagine that Marianna has read Jackson’s (1982) paper, and foresees the 
kind of conceptual difficulties she will face upon exiting. The premise I wish to defend is that these 
factors, and undoubtedly many more, can be regarded as influencing what happens to Marianna, 
conceptually-speaking, when she sees that coloured card for the first time. Such features leave Marianna 
primed ready to expect something to happen upon her exit. 
 
To start thinking about what might happen to Marianna in a world with different normative rules, I 
appeal to a list of examples provided by Wittgenstein:  
 
In a world different from ours colours might play a different role. Think of various cases. 
                                                          
12 Of course, proponents of the Knowledge Argument need not suggest that acquaintance alone suffices. This does 
not alter the fact that they, in fact, do suggest this.  
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(1) Certain colours are tied to certain forms. Circular shapes, red, rectangular ones, 
green, etc. 
(2) Dyes can’t be produced. You can’t colour things. 
(3) One colour always linked together with a foul smell, or poisonousness. 
(4) A far greater incidence of colour-blindness than now exists. 
(5) Different shades of grey abound; all other colours are extremely rare. 
(6) We can reproduce a great many shades of colour from memory. If our number 
system is connected with the number of our fingers, then why shouldn’t our 
system of colours be connected with the specific ways in which they occur. 
(7) A colour occurs only in gradual transition into another one. 
(8) Colours always occur in the sequence of colours in the rainbow. 
RPP, Vol. 2, §658 
 
My initial response to this list is to try and imagine each bizarre scenario. I am not even sure how to begin 
envisaging (8), and do not much understand the second part of (6). The overall impression the list makes, 
it seems, is someway clearer. If the world were any of these kinds of ways, then it is likely that our 
concepts, especially our colour concepts, would have very different functions compared to those that they 
have in our lives. Some effects may be relatively slight―(2), perhaps, or (3)―some much more radical. I 
find (5) particularly intriguing, it conjures up ideas of a society with conspiracy tales of their occurrence, or 
where religious significance may be attached to them, and so on. The list provides a springboard for 
thinking about how alterations to the physical constitution of the world and alterations to our cognitive 
and sensory constitutions might fundamentally affect the kinds of normative rules governing the use of 
colour concepts. The deeper message behind this list, perhaps, is to encourage us to think about the 
particularity, and the fragility, of the circumstances which give rise to our own uptake of concepts. 
 
In a more detailed example, Wittgenstein considers another possibility: 
 
Suppose I were to come to a country where the colour of things―as I would say―changed 
constantly, say because of a peculiarity of the atmosphere. The inhabitants never see 
unchanging colours. Their grass looks green one moment, red at the next, etc. Could these 
people teach their children the words for colours?—First of all, it might be that their 
language lacked words for colours. And if we found this out we might explain it by saying 
that they had little or no use for certain language-games. 
 RPP, Vol. 2, §198 
 
Let us assume Marianna has been brought up in this environment. Let us further assume that the 
community does lack words for colours, due to their constant radical shifting. Furthermore, suppose that 
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the community lacks any other recognised way of referring to such colour shifts. In other words, the 
whole notion of colour is entirely foreign to this community, and plays no role in their practices. The 
relevant question is whether phenomenal concepts might survive in the face of these whole-sale changes. 
 
Suppose we (as visitors to the community) attempt to replicate the coloured card experiment in the 
colour-changing world. We show a coloured card to Marianna, only this time noticing that it changes 
colour during the course of our showing. Let us suppose further that at some specified time during our 
showing, the card flashes a distinctive red colour. At this specified time, Marianna’s situation in regards to 
the ostensive definition of coloured card is the same as the original case involving Marianna: She is 
situated in front of the coloured piece of card and, for that moment at least, her gaze is directed onto the 
sample of red in the same way. Moreover, our intention is to point out to Marianna the sample of red, we 
may even attempt to guide her by saying “That, Marianna, is what we mean by ‘red’”. Can we say, in this 
instance, that Marianna gains a new concept in virtue of the acquaintance? 
 
If the only information Marianna is given about the colour red stems from what we do at that instant, 
then it seems to me more likely that Marianna will form no such concept of red. The reason for this is 
that there is slim evidence to suggest that she registers the colour in any way. She has no language to 
speak about it, it is doubtful whether she will visually classify the colour or imaginatively recreate it. 
Marianna’s reaction will more likely be to question whether we mean the card itself by calling it ‘red’. The 
whole point of the exercise, it seems, will pass Marianna by. Only if we then go on to call it something 
else when its colour has changed a few times may Marianna begin to get an inkling of what we are talking 
about. But then this takes us beyond the confines of ostensive definition; only once Marianna begins to 
get the right kind of ‘training’ (PI §§5-6) in what we mean, and some background about what we are 
trying to classify, will she start forming concepts. The first instance of ostensive definition, I argue, need 
not present Marianna with any special concept simply in virtue of her acquaintance:  
 
Do not believe that you have the concept of colour within you because you look at a 
coloured object―however you look. Z §332 
 
This suggests that more is required than an act of ostensive definition, more than just ‘acquaintance with 
an experience’. 
 
In fact, we do not need to consider alterations to the physical world in order to imagine changes to 
Marianna’s conceptual uptake. Equally relevant are Marianna’s own ‘interests’ and the interests of her 





I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite 
different concepts ... For here life would run on differently.―What interests us would not 
interest them. Z §§387-388 
 
Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expressions of our interest, and direct our 
interest. PI §570 
 
What such considerations bring out is just how much we rely on other factors beyond acquaintance in 
establishing meaning. As such, we are drawn towards the conclusion that in addition to acquaintance with 
the requisite experience, it is equally a prerequisite for the experiencing subject to be grounded within a 
normative framework that enables them to recognise and categorise such experiences. Without the right 
environmental conditions, without the right kind of ‘training’, without the right interests, there is no 
guarantee that acquaintance will successfully elicit phenomenal concepts.  
 
Again and again, Wittgenstein uses examples and thought-experiments to emphasise both similarities and 
dissimilarities when compared with how our language functions (see PI §§130-1). The point of this exercise 
is intended to shake us out of seeing language function in one way: “In philosophy one feels forced to look 
at a concept in a certain way. What I do is to suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it” (as 
quoted in Malcolm, 1984, p.43). By altering the supporting conditions wherein phenomenal concepts are 
usually formed, and imagining potential knock-on effects, we are encouraged to consider the hotchpotch 
coming together of language, concepts, environment, physiology, and culture, and how they all interact in 
complex ways to contribute towards explaining how concept acquisition takes place. A general theory of 
‘acquaintance alone’ simply fails to recognise this. In view of this, the claim that ‘acquaintance’ plays some 
special role is to be resisted, in favour of a more holistic attention to the surrounding context.  
 
Do these considerations lead to the conclusion that Wittgenstein would object to the existence of 
phenomenal concepts? My answer to this is that if phenomenal concepts are defined as concepts of 
experiences that are formed solely through the acquaintance, then yes, Wittgenstein does oppose them. 
However if, as I wish to defend for the rest of this essay, we can specify an alternative account for how 
phenomenal concepts are acquired, one that respects the considerations alluded to above, then it is by no 
means clear that Wittgenstein is an opponent of phenomenal concepts. Rather, he is opposing only how 
some philosophers set about characterising them, and questions the plausibility of the idea that we can 
imagine someone who forms concepts irrespective of normative constraints of one kind or another. As 
will be argued for in Part IV, it is just this conception of concepts which is the real target of the PLA, 











Whatever we might conclude about its argumentative merits, Balog’s and Papineau’s criticism can hardly 
be regarded as adhering to the highest standards of exegetical rigour. Indeed, only two remarks from 
Philosophical Investigations, §§257-8, are referenced to defend their interpretations. Admittedly, exegetical 
rigour is not the object of their investigations. However if we want to know why we should believe that 
Wittgenstein defends the ideas they suggest, it is pertinent to ask how they justify attributing such views 
to Wittgenstein in the first place. Fortunately, insofar as they attribute Wittgenstein as advocating a ‘public 
check’ theory of meaning, their exegetical allegiances can be more easily surmised. The attribution of a 
public check theory of meaning chiefly derives from the ‘Kripke-Fogelin’ interpretation of the PLA 
(hereafter ‘K-F interpretation’).13 According to the K-F interpretation, the idea that mental concepts must 
be susceptible to public scrutiny is regarded as an extension of the more general premise set out earlier in 
the Investigations (PI §§185-242), namely that all concepts must be susceptible to such checks.  
 
The public check theory of meaning itself supposedly arises in response to a paradox that faces traditional 
referentialist theories of meaning:  
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course 
of action can be made out to accord with the rule. PI §201 
 
The K-F interpretation claims that Wittgenstein fully accepted the radical conclusion of this paradox, that 
‘there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word’ (Kripke, 1982, p.55), and offered a 
‘sceptical solution’ in light of it. The solution was to adopt a ‘Community Thesis’ which recognises the 
rule-governing community as sole determinant of whether particular instances of concept application are 
successful in conveying meaning (see Kripke, 1982, chapters 2 and 3, Fogelin, 1987, chapter 11 and 12, 
especially pp.179-183).14  
 
                                                          
13 I call this the ‘K-F’ interpretation because both Kripke and Fogelin were early proponents of the view that 
Wittgenstein defends a ‘public checkability’ theory of meaning. Fogelin even goes so far as to acknowledge that 
there is ‘nothing important that distinguishes our two interpretations’ (1987, p.242, fn.8). 
14 Other proponents of a version of Community Thesis include e.g. Norman Malcolm and John Canfield (see e.g. 
Malcolm, 1986, 1989, Canfield, 1996)). Not all versions of Community Thesis adopt Kripke and Fogelin’s version of 
it, and there is certainly no a priori requirement to endorse the even more specific Public Check Argument either. 
For the purposes of this essay I have no determinate opinion over the wider issue of whether some version of 
Community Thesis might be correct. My scope is here limited to criticising the Kripke-Fogelin line. 
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One consequence of this move to the Community Thesis is supposedly summarised at PI §202: 
 
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey 
a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying 
a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.  
 
In short, if the community determines correct and incorrect applications of rules, then there can be no 
such thing as a privately-determined rule. The reason for this is that without independent jurisdiction, 
whatever one decided to count as a correct application of the concept would therefore, in virtue of the 
very decision, be a correct application. And such a conclusion is surely awry, because there needs to be a 
distinction between something seeming to be a correct application and something actually being a correct 
application. This distinction cannot be maintained without an independent arbiter, and so it follows that 
public standards of checkability are a necessary condition for meaning (see e.g. Kripke, 1982, p.167).  
 
The K-F interpretation then claims that the consequences of this paradox are reiterated in the PLA, 
where it is used to argue against the idea that mental concepts are determined privately: 
 
The impossibility of private language emerges as a corollary of his sceptical solution to his 
own paradox ... It turns out that the sceptical solution does not allow us to speak of a single 
individual, considered by himself and in isolation, as ever meaning anything (Kripke, 1982, 
pp.68-9) 
 
The problem with this, as already stated in PI §202, is that if an individual is in charge of whether they 
have correctly applied a rule governing the use of a mental concept, then: 
 
...whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk 
about ‘right’. PI §258 
 
In other words, if I am judge and jury over whether a mental concept has been applied correctly, (i.e. if 
the rules are (in this sense) privately determined), then whatever ‘seems right to me is right’; and this, for 
the reasons given above, is unacceptable.  
 
Papineau records Wittgenstein’s response to this as follows: 
 
Wittgenstein took it to be a condition on properly meaningful terms that their meaning be 
communicable. A coinage whose content must remain private to the coiner of the term is no 




According to this line of thinking, Wittgenstein would be opposed to the very idea of phenomenal 
concepts: Phenomenal concepts are concepts which purport to refer to something that can only be 
accessed privately by the experiencer. However, as per the PLA, concepts must be publically accessible in 
order to count as meaningful. Therefore, there can be no phenomenal concepts. And as discussed, it is on 
this basis that Balog and Papineau respond with the Knowledge Argument: The PLA defends the view 
that concepts must be publically accessible. However, as per the Knowledge Argument, there are 
phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are private, in that they can only be accessed by the 
experiencer. Therefore, the PLA is mistaken. 
 
The major flaw in Balog’s and Papineau’s argument is that the K-F interpretation is not actually endorsed 
by Wittgenstein. This point I take to be well-established after the long exegetical battles of the 1980s and 
1990s (see e.g. Hacker, 1986, Stern, 1994, pp.424-432, Miller and Wright (edd.), 2002).15 So I will not 
spare much space retreading well-worn refutations, except insofar as to briefly continue a thought 
developing from the criticism that Kripke fails to consider the second part of PI §201(see e.g. McDowell, 
1984, McGinn, 1984, Pears, 1988, pp.467ff., for detailed statements of this objection). The subsection 
reads: 
 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of 
our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least 
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that 
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what 
we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. 
 
In this crucial passage, Wittgenstein makes explicit that he does not accept the sceptical conclusion of the 
paradox. Rather, he rejects its key premise; he regards it is a ‘misunderstanding’ to think that rule-
following requires interpretation. So Wittgenstein does not reject the place of rules within our practices, 
he does not concede to the paradox that ‘no course of action could be determined by a rule’. Instead he 
stresses that we rethink the basis on which rules are followed. The K-F interpretation completely misses 
this rejoinder to the paradox. 
  
This now begs the question, how are rules followed? The following is, I believe, an indicative remark of 
Wittgenstein’s response to this question: 
 
                                                          
15 Although see Kusch (2006) for a sophisticated defence. 
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Does human agreement decide what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the majority? Were we 
taught to determine colour in that way? Z §431 
 
The obvious answer to these questions is ‘no’. It is all too convoluted a picture to fit with how we follow 
rules during the course of our busy lives. Of course, there is agreement (for the most part) about how to 
apply colour concepts to which kinds of objects, in which kinds of circumstances, and so forth. 
Otherwise the game would never get off the ground. However, agreement is not reached via an overt 
decision to do so; we don’t take a vote and ‘appeal to the majority.’ Rather:  
 
“So you are saying that human beings decide what is true and what is false?”―It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life. PI §241 
 
 Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination OC §475 
 
Agreement is reached out of ‘form of life’, not ‘opinions’. Ignoring the extensive connotations of the term 
‘form of life’, part of the message here is that rules are followed for the most part in virtue of something 
more akin to a propensity than to a ratiocination. In accordance with these remarks is the idea that rule-
following is not the result of interpreting the rule in some cognitively prescient fashion. On most occasions, 
we just ‘obey the rule blindly’ (PI §219). Just as we are inclined to obey rules blindly, just as we are inclined 
to tacitly accept that others follow rules correctly, there is a similar ethos when it comes to our own use of 
concepts: 
 
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it 
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false OC §94, also see §§358-9 
 
 
It is a consistent theme of Wittgenstein’s to emphasise that it is our inculcation or ‘training’ (e.g. PI §§5-6, 
198) from which we go on to act how we do and draw the kinds of distinctions we draw. The community 
rarely actively legislates over what counts as right or wrong concept application in practice. Agreement, 
insofar as it is required, is typically assumed to be sound unless there is good reason for suspicion 
otherwise.  This is what distinguishes us from the fastidious shopkeeper of PI §1, who checks each word 
of the note in order to fulfil the request for ‘five red apples’. There are certain things that we accept 
without feeling the need for much scrutiny. If rule-following is indeed like this, then it is not at all 
obvious that the existence of phenomenal concepts need be discounted by the K-F interpretation. Insofar 
as our use of concepts are publically checked, then, we might suppose that such checking procedures are 
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fairly lax whereby, say, all that is required to ‘behave appropriately’ and so pass the check is for us to avow 
possessing the requisite concept when questioned by a member of the community.  
 
Balog and Papineau intend something significantly stronger than the lax public checks I refer to above. 
Indeed, they seem to require that the only sorts of checks capable of satiating public scrutiny are ones 
where the public have direct access to the concept. And possibly for good reason; it might be claimed that 
direct access is required in virtue of the nature of phenomenal concepts―their meaning is wholly attached 
to the direct subjective experience. In consequence, there is, effectively, no such thing as a phenomenal 
concept understood indirectly: the concept of an experience that is understood indirectly will be a 
different concept from the concept of that experience understood directly. In order to understand the 
phenomenal concept, one has to be the possessor of it. And, as per PI §§202 and 258, a concept cut off 
from the jurisdiction of the community in this way, can be no genuine concept at all. 
 
I suggest that this desire for direct access is, at least from a Wittgensteinian point of view, misleading. It 
gets matters back to front. The important question is not whether the community can understand a 
concept without having direct access to it, but whether that lack of access is something that troubles the 
community. And the answer to this question, for Wittgenstein, is not predetermined by a priori general 
constraints on meaning but by the idiosyncrasies of the community itself. For Wittgenstein:  
 
Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game. It characterises 
what we call description (RFM, p.330) 
 
It is the fact that we follow rules which counts as ‘fundamental’ to the game being played. It is not, pace 
the K-F interpretation, the community or susceptibility to a public check that is fundamental. That is, the nature 
of agreement over what counts as acceptable or unacceptable conditions for concept application are not 
predetermined according to some general constraint on meaning, such as susceptibility to a public check, 






Papineau and Balog’s approach to Wittgenstein’s notion of privacy can be stated bluntly: Wittgenstein 
rejects privacy. If Wittgenstein rejects privacy, and phenomenal concepts are private, it follows that 




The biggest problem for this approach is that it fails to recognise Wittgenstein’s far more nuanced 
position in regards to privacy. Specifically, it conflates at the very least two distinct kinds of privacy: logical 
privacy and what I will term non-logical privacy. This distinction is drawn from the very opening of the 
PLA at PI §243, where Wittgenstein explicitly endorses the idea that there are some kinds of thoughts 
which are recognisably ‘private’―we are given an example where one writes in a private code, another 
example where one talks to oneself in monologue, and even an example where there is an imagined 
society of people who only speak to themselves, in monologue. Of course, these cases differ: the private 
code is private because it is indecipherable, the internal monologue is private because others cannot hear 
it, and the society of monolinguists’ thoughts are private, perhaps, because others cannot question what 
their thoughts are. However, all these examples represent perfectly meaningful uses of language where, in 
the requisite sense, such use is ‘private’, insofar as it is inaccessible to others. However, these examples are 
‘not what [Wittgenstein] mean[s]’ when he speaks of a logically private language. As per PI §243: ‘the 
individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his 
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language’ (emphasis added). One 
reason why non-logical privacy differs from logical privacy is that although it is true that the thoughts 
expressed in the non-logical cases are in fact inaccessible to others, this need not be so. The private code 
writer could provide a key for his code, one could share one’s thoughts publically, and the society of 
monolinguists could learn to speak in dialogue (perhaps with the help of the explorer). So although those 
cases of privacy are not accessible to others, it is in principle possible that they could be accessed. Part of 
what makes the logically private language interesting, then, is that it is supposed to represent an example 
where the meaning of that language cannot be understood by anyone but the speaker. It is only these 
logically private concepts which are the target of the PLA.  
 
The root question, then, is whether Papineau is right to interpret Wittgenstein as committed to the idea 
that incommunicable sensation concepts are private in the logical sense, and thus to be rejected. To 
answer this, we can look to the short remark at PI §248: 
  
The proposition “Sensations are private” is comparable to: “One plays patience by oneself” 
 
The rules of patience dictate that the game is played by one person, and in this sense, patience is a game 
that is played privately. There are, for instance, no two player versions of patience, (except insofar as one 
might derive some variant version where two or more people take it in turns to move). Clearly, however, 
patience is not a logically private game. Patience is a game with a common set of rules, rules that others 
can readily understand. I think this is the comparison Wittgenstein wishes to draw with sensations in PI 
§248: sensation concepts refer to feelings that can only be had by the individual who feels the pain, and so 
are private. However, similarly to patience, this privacy is part of the game: it is part of the (commonly 
understood) rules for ‘having a pain’ that they refer to sensations that are privately accessible only to the 
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person having the pain. This contrasts with logical privacy, where the rules are private too, insofar as others 
do not so much as understand the game one is playing. I return to the positive question of what logical 
privacy itself is in more detail in Part IV. The relevant point for now is that, for Wittgenstein, the privacy 
of sensations does not amount to logical privacy, insofar as those who do not have it are still capable of 
understanding it as a pain that the individual feels.  
 
This brings us to the question: Is Marianna’s ‘Φ sensation’ concept private in this relatively innocuous 
non-logical sense? In Papineau’s defence, Marianna’s ‘Φ sensation’ is not a straightforward instance of a 
sensation concept that follows rules which are readily understandable by others. Unlike the concept ‘pain’, 
Marianna is unable to communicate which sensation her concept refers to. So nobody, except Marianna, 
can know whether what she feels is a tingle, a pang, an ache, a throb, a tickle, and so on. They may even 
doubt whether Marianna is really referring to a sensation at all, given how she is incapable of 
communicating what her new concept refers to. Marianna herself might not even know what to call what 
just happened to her; she might, for instance, misname it as a burn, or a scratch. This all makes 
Marianna’s concept increasingly inaccessible to others. 
 
However, what Marianna shares with the early examples of PI §243 and the comparison with patience at 
PI §248, is that although she initially cannot communicate what her concept refers to, there is no barrier 
in principle to her being able to do so in the future. There are no a priori prohibitions on Marianna’s 
coming to communicate in a publically understandable language what her ‘Φ sensation’ concept refers to, 
given propitious circumstances, i.e. circumstances where she can align her ‘Φ sensation’ with its 
counterpart in public language. All she has to do is ask her tormentors the right questions, or wait for the 
sensation to occur again, or observe someone else get a shock and then getting one oneself. There is even 
scope for saying that Marianna can communicate what her concept refers to in at least some publically 
understandable form―she knows that what she felt is sharp, painful, unpleasant, and so on. Perhaps, 
similarly to Hume’s missing shade of blue, she might be able to interpolate that her ‘Φ sensation’ refers to 
tingling on those bases alone. So Marianna’s concept is in principle intelligible to others, even if, as it so 
stands, it is incommunicable at the time at which she first forms the concept. In light of this, I think we 
should conclude that Marianna’s privacy is to be classed as an example of non-logical privacy. 
 
Bizarrely, in the midst of his exposition, Papineau comments that he personally supports a distinction 
between kinds of privacy. Furthermore, he thinks Marianna’s privacy is a genuine case of non-logical 
privacy, privacy that is in principle perfectly intelligible. Papineau even references the argument presented 
by Hopkins (1974), which explicitly defends the view that Wittgenstein was well aware of such a 
distinction and only objected to ‘in principle’ private concepts. In the face of all of this, Papineau still 
concludes that Wittgenstein would object to Marianna’s in principle publically intelligible concept (2011, 
pp.181-2). I must admit that the only reason I can find for Papineau drawing this conclusion, in face of all 
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this contrary evidence, is because of a dogged commitment to the bad arguments of the K-F 
interpretation. 
 
Papineau goes on to levy a sophisticated charge against Wittgenstein, arguing that the PLA ‘also places 
strong further requirements on the way such reference may be secured in the first place’ (ibid. p.181, also 
see his 2002, pp.128-132). Papineau argues that Marianna’s discovery that her Φ sensation is, in fact, what 
is commonly referred to as a pain sensation must be an empirical discovery; it is not a discovery that 
Marianna can make simply by reflection on the two concepts. But, Papineau argues, here’s the rub; a 
posteriori identities cannot be achieved unless the two sides of the identity already have determinate 
meaning. If this is so, then ‘Φ sensation’ must have determinate meaning prior to its identification with 
the publically understood concept ‘pain sensation.’ And if this is right, then the point at which Marianna 
first coins her concept ‘Φ sensation’, her coining must have been established privately. And this, Papineau 
claims, is contrary to the standards imposed by the PLA (2011, p.182). Contrary to the above arguments, 
one cannot reply by arguing that her private concept is in principle intelligible to all, because prior to the 
discovery, Marianna had no way of telling whether her new concept was logically private or non-logically 
so. So far as Marianna is concerned before her discovery, it could equally have turned out that her ‘Φ 
sensation’ referred to a kind of sensation which was in principle incommunicable. In which case, she 
could not have set up the concept in the first place. And yet, even though for all Marianna knew her 
concept was logically private, it is still plausible to suggest that she forms a genuine concept. 
 
This response takes us towards much deeper divisions in opinion about the nature of concepts, and about 
the ‘where and when’ semantics takes hold in the order of explanation concerning the origins of 
conceptual mastery. One question to pursue is to ask whether the discovery is straightforwardly empirical, 
whether Marianna’s identification of her concept with the public concept arises simply as a result of her 
relating her private concept with the public one. As I suggest in my first main response to Papineau’s 
interpretation, there is a question regarding the influence of deeper normative forces which underlie the 
ability for one to form a concept in the first place. And, if my suggestions there are correct, Marianna’s 
acquisition of her ‘Φ sensation’ is, at least in part, already someway pre-prepared before she then goes on 
to make her discovery about the identity of it with red sensations. If this is so, Papineau’s claim that 
Marianna’s formation of her ‘Φ sensation’ concept is acquired entirely in private is belied by the far more 
complex normative situation in which Marianna finds herself. Marianna knows that there are things we 
call sensations, she has had many kinds of such feelings, is aware that sensations have distinctive 
qualitative feels, that  vary in intensity, and so forth. Moreover, it seems plausible that Marianna is able to 
reflect on this and make rational inferences about how the kind of experience she is undergoing fits into 
these related aspects of experience. Arguably, then, Marianna’s uptake of ‘Φ sensation’ and her 
consequent identification of it with ‘red sensation’ does not arise in some kind of semantic vacuum, but is 
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continuous with many other things Marianna knows about the world. Marianna’s acquisition arises from 
within a normative framework of rules, not without. 
 
Papineau sees matters differently. According to Papineau, normative rules ‘follow from the prior 
naturalistic constitution of content, and are not a precondition thereof’ (2002, p.129). Applying to 
Marianna: Marianna is naturally endowed with concept-forming capacities which, given the appropriate 
circumstances in her environment, will cause her to form the requisite concept (as per a properly 
developed teleosemantic theory of meaning (see Millikan (1984), Papineau (1999)). Accordingly, she is 
able to form concepts even though she is ‘not sensitive to any normative principles tying its use to public 
criteria’ (Papineau, 2002, p.129, emphasis added). Under this theory, Marianna can, in a situation lacking 
any normative principles, set up a new concept by taking ‘a potential experience concept’ from an innate 
stock of potential concepts for types of experience, and ‘lock[ing] it onto the type of experience at hand. 
Nothing more is needed’ (Papineau, 2011, p.182). 
 
If the arguments presented in my first objection are on target, then we should discount Marianna as 
representing a good example of someone who forms a concept in enough of a semantic vacuum to show 
that she is capable of acquiring her concept without ‘any normative principles’ guiding her. In which case 
Papineau is left to answer the challenge: Can we find clear examples where concept acquisition does occur 
in isolation from normative rules? If such an example can be presented then we might have firmer 
grounds for rejecting the Wittgensteinian approach to explaining concept acquisition. I leave it until Part’s 






If the dialectic of argument is on track, then there is so far no persuasive reason to suspect that 
Wittgenstein would be opposed to phenomenal concepts. This still leaves us with the task of offering 
positive reasons for favouring the view that Wittgenstein would be at ease with the idea of phenomenal 
concepts. It is towards this question to which I now turn. 
 
In an upcoming paper, William Child argues against the view that phenomenal concepts are a proper 
target of the PLA:16 
 
                                                          
16 References to Child’s paper are taken from a draft copy, set to be published soon. 
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I shall argue for the unorthodox view that a Wittgensteinian approach to sensations and 
sensation language can accommodate a version of the idea that there are distinctive concepts 
of sensations that are available only to those who know what it is like to have those 
sensations (p.1) 
 
To defend this unorthodox view,17 Child cites examples suggesting that Wittgenstein expressed a fairly 
casual commitment to the idea that some concepts can be grasped without knowing what it’s like to have 
them: 
 
I [never] have feelings of an invisible presence; other people do, and I can question them 
about their experiences (PI, Part II, §vii, p.184).  
 
Under a natural reading of this example, we might be inclined to say, for example, Wittgenstein knows 
that such feelings occur when entering old houses, or that such feelings make one go cold and breathless. 
He knows that there is something it is like to have those feelings, even though he does not know what 
those feelings feel like. So Wittgenstein has more than enough semantic grounds to get by in a perfectly 
meaningful conversation with those who do have such feelings. With this point in mind, Child introduces 
the more interesting question in relation to Wittgenstein exegesis: 
 
...would [Wittgenstein] accept that there are also concepts of experience that are available only 
to those who do know what it is like to have those experiences?’ (Child, p.4, emphasis 
added). 
 
This question revolves around whether Wittgenstein accommodates for the idea that there is a certain 
kind of knowledge (typically) available only through being appropriately acquainted with the right kind of 
experience. As discussed, critics argue that this scenario is surely in tension with the PLA because it 
suggests that securing the reference of a distinctive kind of concept is possible by relying squarely on 
acquaintance with the right kinds of experiences and the individual’s innate cognitive powers to 
conceptualise the experience appropriately (see Papineau, 2011, p.182). 
 
Child draws attention to another example: 
 
Remembering has no experiential content ... Would this situation be conceivable: for the first 
time in his life someone remembers something and says: ‘Yes, now I know what 
                                                          
17 The interpretation is ‘unorthodox’ in its attempt to accommodate for phenomenal concepts. Not only does this 
challenge Balog and Papineau, and therefore advocates of the K-F interpretation. It also opposes ideas defended by 
Hacker (2012), Hanfling (2001a), and Malcolm (1984b), who argue at length that Wittgenstein would have given 
short shrift to the idea that there is ‘something it is like’ to be conscious.  
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“remembering” is, what it feels like to remember’. – How does he know that this feeling is 
‘remembering’?  Compare: ‘Yes, now I know what “tingling” is’ (he has perhaps had an 
electric shock for the first time). (PI, Part II, §xiii p.196) 
 
The main point of this remark is to criticise the idea that ‘remembering’ possesses distinct ‘experiential 
content’ (what I am calling ‘phenomenal character’). What is notable for present purposes is 
Wittgenstein’s contrast between ‘remembering’ and ‘tingling’. ‘Tingling’ is here represented as an example 
of a mental (sensation) concept which does possess a distinctly phenomenal character, and so is tied up 
with distinctive qualitative properties, with feeling a particular way. So, again, Wittgenstein appears to be 
relaxed about the idea that some concepts get their meaning through referring to the phenomenal 
character of the experience; moreover, in this passage, he readily admits that knowledge of such concepts 
is based on acquaintance with the experience―the subject knows what ‘tingling’ is, only after having the 
shock for the first time. 
 
Based on this ready acknowledgement of how sensation concepts possess distinctive phenomenal 
characters, Child suggests that the ‘tingling’ example can be naturally converted into a version of 
Knowledge Argument: 
 
[Let us assume] the subject already has a way of picking out the sensation of tingling: he can 
think of it, say, as the sensation one has when one has a mild electric shock. Then he has an 
electric shock for the first time; he experiences the tingling sensation for the first time. At 
that point he can truly say, or think, ‘Now I know what tingling is; what it feels like to have 
an electric shock.’ And, though Wittgenstein does not put it this way, it seems reasonable to 
say that the person is now in a position to think of the sensation of tingling in a new way; a 
way that draws on his own experience of tingling sensations (Child, p.5) 
 
According to the scenario, the subject has an understanding of tingling sensations prior to the experience. 
He knows that tingling sensations are caused by electric shocks, that they are painful, and so on. Even so, 
in virtue of receiving the shock for the first time, the subject can now think of tingling in a new way, one 
that draws from the ‘experiential content’ of the sensation. This way of thinking was unavailable 
beforehand. If this scenario is plausibly conceived, it appears to show Wittgenstein at ease with the idea 
that there are concepts which can be acquired only after having had the relevant experience. 
 
The tingling example so far stated may be criticised on similar grounds to the way in which the Mary 
example was criticised earlier. That is, one could argue that the scenario somehow fails to represent a 
satisfactory example for supporting a Knowledge Argument. Prefiguring this objection, Child introduces 
an extension to the ‘tingling’ case similar to the extension from Mary to Marianna (ibid. p.5). As with the 
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original scenario, we are to suppose that the subject has never felt a tingling sensation, but yet knows that 
electric shocks cause tingling sensations, that they are painful etc. However, in this new case, we give the 
subject a series of electric shocks, but without telling him that this is what we are doing. Child argues that in this 
case, similarly to Marianna, we can imagine the subject mastering a use for the concept ‘Φ sensation’, 
even though he doesn’t realise that his ‘Φ sensation’ concept refers to the same sensation that other 
people refer to when speaking of ‘tingling sensations’. He might be able to imaginatively recreate the Φ 
sensation, and make truth-evaluable judgements regarding it. Moreover, learning that his Φ sensations are 
tingling sensations seems like genuine epistemic progress, insofar as there is something illuminating about 
this discovery. It seems, then, that he can form a concept through ‘only’ being acquainted with the 
experience, and this is possible quite aside from any ability to convey in publically understandable 
language just what his ‘Φ sensation’ concept refers to. He can seemingly do all of this without support 
from the community and in virtue of his natural powers of introspection. And crucially, if Child’s line of 
reasoning is correct, this is all compatible with a Wittgensteinian rendering of phenomenal concepts. 
 
I fully agree with Child’s unorthodoxy here; there is clear textual support indicating ways in which 
Wittgenstein would be at ease with the idea of phenomenal concepts. I also think that if we allow for a 
broader understanding of phenomenal concepts, then we can continue this line of thought in new 
interesting directions. 
 
Current literature on phenomenal concepts concentrates on what we might term ‘basic sensorial experiences’, 
the majority of examples revolving around sensory stimulations as occur when e.g. seeing a red rose, 
hearing a new sound, or smelling a new smell. Papineau even goes so far as to explicitly defend a version 
of the idea that phenomenal concepts are a special variety of perceptual concepts (see his (2006, §3.2), and 
(2011, p.176);18 there is, I think, more than a hint of classical empiricism to this position. This balance of 
emphasis on sensory experience derives, perhaps, from the influence of Jackson’s (1982) paper, which 
explicitly takes issue with Nagel’s (1974) definition of consciousness as ‘what it is like to be’ something. 
There, Jackson avers that philosophical focus ought to be rightly oriented over questions concerning the 
qualitative properties of conscious experience, rather than what it is like to be a conscious subject (see 
Jackson, 1982, p.130). I disagree with this limitation in philosophical focus, and believe it is a virtue of 
Nagel’s paper that he latches on to what we might term as ‘non-sensorial experience,’ experiences that do not 
obviously refer to the specifically sensory aspect of the experience. 
 
                                                          
18 In his (2006, footnote 12), Papineau alludes to the possibility of which I am about to focus heavily on, namely that 
there exist nonperceptual (or at least non-sensorially perceptual) but yet phenomenal concepts. In my view, accepting 
this premise allows us to envisage a far wider scope for the role that phenomenal concepts play in our cognitions. 
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I want to use the term ‘perspective’ to incorporate this wider sense by which to understand experience, as 
contrasted perhaps with the prior focus on ‘perception’.19 By perspective, one includes sensorial 
experiences, but also describes the non-sensorial features of experience, which at a local level might 
include the beliefs and attitudes as expressed by an individual, and on a more global level as the world-view, 
or form of life in virtue of which one assesses, and takes part in, their environment. At present, there is not 
room to defend this position with any depth, however the basic intuition is as follows: Consciousness is 
not merely the result of successions of qualitative perceptions; rather, these successions are organised and 
arranged within a perspective which situates them, assigns them relative significance, and responds to 
them in ways it deems appropriate. This perspective is formed, in part, as a result of upbringing within a 
particular complex normative framework, or socio-cultural milieu.20 Radically divergent perspectives give 
rise to failures in understanding and communication even though the sensory stimulations might be of 
equal or similar viscosity. In at least some cases, then, understanding requires sharing a perspective, not 
just a perception. 
 
It is my view that Wittgenstein sometimes latches onto this sort of idea. In the following passage, 
Wittgenstein certainly seems committed to the idea that there is a certain kind of understanding available 
only to those who share in a form of life: 
 
We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as 
regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We 
learn this when we come to a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is 
more, even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand the people. (And 
not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet 
with them. (PI, Part II, §xi, p.190)  
 
Here we might imagine that the traveller has acute anthropological understanding; he understands that 
these exotic people believe such and such, display such and such a ritual, revere these idols, and so on. 
And yet, for all of this, we can imagine that the traveller might still feel that he doesn’t understand what it 
is like to be them, that he doesn’t quite grasp their way of life.  
 
To develop this thought with a biographical example; on a number of occasions Wittgenstein confessed 
his inability to believe the Christian doctrines that his Catholic friends, Elizabeth Anscombe and Yorick 
Smythies, believed (see e.g. Malcolm, 1984a, p.60 and Monk, 1990, pp.463-4). Specifically, he stated that 
he could not believe in the resurrection, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, or the idea that Jesus is Lord. 
However, Wittgenstein claimed that this inability was not due to the fact that he ‘believed in the opposite’ 
                                                          
19 Nagel (1974) focuses towards phenomenal character in this wider sense, although he equivocates somewhat. 
20 This is not to mention the more obviously physical-causal conditions required for forming a perspective. 
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to them over such matters (LCA, p.53, also pp.54-9). Rather, his complaint concerned his inability to 
utter expressions of these beliefs with any genuine meaning; e.g. the word ‘Lord’, he says, could convey 
meaning for him ‘only if [he] lived completely differently’ (CV, p.33, see ibid. pp.32-3). Just what 
Wittgenstein doesn’t understand about his friends religious beliefs is an important question that I cannot 
here pursue with requisite depth (although see Schroeder, 2007, and Tripodi, 2013, for interesting 
discussion). However, what is clear is that Wittgenstein is claiming that there is a sense in which he does 
not fully understand the meaning behind his friends’ uses of the word ‘Lord,’ and that this inability was 
due to the fact that, as one commentator puts it, there are some religious ‘truths whose accessibility 
conditions include certain requirements as to the attitude of the subject’ (Cottingham 2010, p.223). 
 
These examples show Wittgenstein expressing commitment to the idea that there is a kind of 
understanding available only through sharing the attitudes and beliefs, the ‘form of life’, of those who do 
embrace such things. Furthermore, this understanding can be represented as a distinct kind of knowing 
‘what it is like’, one that is unavailable to the uninitiated. Without sharing in the form of life, whatever 
wealth of descriptive information and understanding one might accumulate about, for example, 
transubstantiation, one will still be in the dark when it comes to all the peculiarities which positively 
contribute to an understanding of what it is like to experience in those kinds of ways. We might say that 
without being able to share in these experiences, one can sympathise with those who do experience them, 
but never truly empathise. Another way of expressing this is to say that there are some aspects of our 
experiences that are private, in the sense that they are beyond the understanding of those who do not 
sufficiently share in our form of life. Such differences in perspective give reason to consider a new 
dimension to Wittgenstein’s notion of privacy, and the ways in which we might have access, and fail to 




PART III: Externalist interpretations of the PLA 
 
 
If Wittgenstein is no opponent of phenomenal concepts, the following question repeats itself: What does 
count as a genuine instance of logical privacy, as per the PLA? In this Part, the externalist interpretations 
of Wittgenstein’s response to this question will be critically discussed, as found in Pears (1988, 2008) and 
Child (2011, forthcoming), and elements of which are found in Hacker (e.g. 1993a, 1993b).  
 
 




According to Child’s interpretation of Wittgenstein: 
 
What individuates sensations? What makes a sensation the kind of sensation it is? When we 
reflect on that question, Wittgenstein thinks, we find it natural to think that sensations are 
individuated by their subjective, introspectible character. And we find it natural to think that 
its subjective character is a purely intrinsic feature of a sensation: a feature whose identity is 
entirely independent of anything to do with the subject’s behaviour or external 
circumstances. ... Such a view of sensations has been dominant in the history of philosophy; 
and it is popular in contemporary philosophy. And, Wittgenstein thinks, it exerts a natural 
appeal on anyone who reflects on the nature of sensations. (2011, pp.151-2) 
 
For Child, the point of the PLA is to oppose the idea that it is the ‘intrinsic’ feel of the sensation that 
matters, picked out ‘purely’ in virtue of its ‘subjective, introspectible character’. It is this view which 
commits those under its influence to (knowingly or not) advocate the existence of a logically private 
language. 
 
The question of who holds this view of sensations is undoubtedly a large one. Child and Pears, (and 
Hacker in similar discussions, see his 1993a, pp.1-2, 8-12, 17-20), indicate some historical sources: 
Descartes is mentioned, presumably insofar as he supposed that he could successfully detach his thinking 
entirely from the external world and still retain meaningful thoughts. Similar views are represented by 
traditional empiricism, such as Locke and Hume, and the more recent sense-data theories as found in e.g. 
Russell, Carnap, and Ayer. It is expressed by Frege and Kant (see Hacker, ibid. pp.17-19). The specific 
theories which articulate such views are perhaps less significant than the ‘natural’ way of thinking about 
sensations out of which such theories arise. The leading idea seems to be that unlike concepts which refer 
to physical objects, and whose meaning derives from their attachment to objects in the ‘external’ world, 
our sensation concepts are meaningful in virtue of referring to objects in our ‘inner’ mental world, i.e. to 
internal sense-impressions. One upshot of this view is accessibility; whereas it can be readily challenged 
whether the bird I am looking at is a crane or a heron, it seems that the only authority on what I am 
feeling, or the way things appear to me, is myself. Only I have direct access to my thoughts and 
sensations, and so only I can know the contents of my mind; the best others can do is to surmise or infer 
about those contents. It is not difficult to see how this ‘natural’ conception of mental content leads 
toward more profound philosophical puzzlements: If only the individual has access to the contents of 
their own mind, then perhaps everybody experiences colours differently (PI §272), perhaps nobody 
except oneself even has sensations at all (PI §420). Such considerations draw us towards a conception of 
mental concepts which specifies them as fundamentally private: If mental concepts refer to inner thoughts 
and sensations, and if those thoughts and sensations can only be accessed by the individual who has 
them, then it appears to follow that the meaning of such concepts can therefore only be accessed by and 
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known to the individual who has them. If this is so, then it seems that we are left with the rudiments of a 
private language.  
 
Child’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s response to this view is worth quoting at length: 
 
The target of the discussion of private language in Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere is a 
view of sensations on which the identity conditions are completely independent of any links 
to external circumstances or behaviour ... Against this view, he argues that there is no way of 
individuating the kind of experience one has when something looks red except in a way that 
ties the character of the experience to the objective circumstance of seeing something red. 
[One might have an experience of something as red when there’s no red thing there (on 
occasion)]. But, Wittgenstein insists, that does not commit us to the idea that experiences 
have phenomenal characters whose identity conditions are entirely independent of all links to 
external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour (forthcoming, p.6) 
 
Child is unequivocal: for Wittgenstein, the point of the PLA is to show that the identity conditions of 
sensations are necessarily tied up with ‘external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour’. (Going forward, 
this idea is what is broadly referred to as externalism). As outlined in my fourth response in Part II, Child 
successfully argues for why Wittgenstein would think there is nothing inherently problematic about 
concepts which are not capable of being communicated to others, as in the case of Marianna. 
Communicability is philosophically-speaking inconsequential to whether or not Marianna exercises a 
concept. Rather, what is essential is whether Marianna’s concept succeeds in referring to some relevant 
feature of the external world. 
 
Similar views are echoed in Pears’ recent monograph: 
 
[Wittgenstein’s] leading idea is that the language in which we report sensations owes its 





...reports of sense-impressions are expressed in a language that is essentially dependent on 
reports of their causes in the physical world, including the bodies of the speakers. (ibid. 
p.50)21 
                                                          





...the function of sense-impressions is to give us information about the physical world in 
which we have to live our lives, and so the meanings of our reports of our sense-impressions 
are preserved by their success in performing this role. (ibid. p.51) 
 
 
The target of the PLA, under these interpretations, is the view that the identity conditions of sensations 
are understandable independently of the external causes by which they are ordinarily associated. Colours 
are properties of objects, and colour concepts are meaningful in virtue of referring to them. Feelings of 
pain are typically caused in response to external stimuli, and pain concepts refer to parts of the body. The 
PLA does not deny that one can, on occasion, identify the sensation without the appropriate external 
correlate (e.g. phantom limbs), or have the external correlate without identifying the sensation (e.g. 
localised anaesthetic). Rather, the target is the idea that sensations can be understood as ‘entirely 
independent’ of any links to the external environment. It is concepts which aim to refer to sensations 
under this guise which represent the real example of logically private concepts, and the kind to which 
Wittgenstein’s PLA is fundamentally opposed. 
 
What is wrong with the disputed view, according to the externalist interpretation? Pears argues that if one 
restricts appeal to only sense-impressions and memory of sense-impressions, then one takes away the 
independent standard necessary for establishing a reliable basis for meaning (see Pears, 2008, pp.43-4, 50-
5): 
 
a colour-word like ‘blue’ could not be given a stable meaning by a would-be private linguist, 
whose only resource would be his visual impressions of blue without any regular connections 
with blue physical objects. He would have to rely on the remembered similarity of a 
sequence of sense impressions ... Wittgenstein’s criticism is that this would not be a reliable 
basis for linguistic regularity [i.e. meaning, see ibid. Chapter 2]. The only way to get a reliable 
basis would be to use physical objects independently known to be blue. (ibid. p.44) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
For since language only derives the way in which it means from its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable which does not represent the world. 
 
As a side-note, I am cautious that this remark should be taken as an authoritative voice of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. The notes from Philosophical Remarks are sometimes a mixture of Tractatus-type views with his newer 
approach to philosophy. The above quote, as it stands, has a disputably-sounding Tractarian ring to it. Even a 
remark such as at PI §23, where Wittgenstein lists ways of using words that do not aim at representing the world, 
might be seen to be in tension with it. But this point belongs to other important issues.   
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One reason this is problematic is that without reference to the physical world it becomes unclear how one 
could distinguish those impressions which are genuine from those impressions which only appear to be. 
After all, both genuine and false impressions present themselves in the same way, i.e. as impressions. 
Without the external world, ‘there would be no criterion of correctness’ (ibid. pp.44) and so we lose the 
ability to make this crucial distinction.  
 
Pears considers Ayer’s response to this argument (Ayer, 1986, pp.75-80). In short, Ayer argues that the 
necessary reference to independent external cues can be preserved, it is just that our understanding of 
those external cues is to be reformulated in ultimately sensory terms. This is achieved by checking a 
current sense impression against a group of sense impressions. A false impression would simply be one 
that fails to stand up against the tribunal of the group. In this way, Ayer argues, the distinction between 
‘genuine’ and ‘false’ impressions can be preserved, it is just that this distinction is to be drawn from within 
the sense-impression framework. 
 
Pears rejects this reformulation as an ‘inadequate substitute’, arguing that it represents an ‘essential 
change’ to the original requirement (op. cit, p.53). In support, he references Wittgenstein: 
 
Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?―The balance on which impressions 
are weighed is not the impression of a balance. PI §259 
 
“Well I believe that this is the sensation S again.”―Perhaps you believe that you believe it!  
PI §260 
 
For Pears, Wittgenstein’s point seems to be that no amount of checking against impressions can make up 
for the severance with the physical world which the sense-data theorist posits. The point here is not to 
defend the sceptical idea that ‘we can never know’ whether our memories are genuine, but to reject the 
idea that memory-images alone could supply such a genuine basis for meaning. Referencing another 
remark of Wittgenstein’s: 
 
For example, I don’t know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to 
check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn’t it the same here?—No; for 
this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of 
the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness 
of the first memory? ... Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table 





As these quotations point towards, sense-impressions, belief-impressions, or memory-impressions cannot 
guarantee that one remembers correctly, for no matter how convinced one may be that the impression 
conveys the right information, unless that conviction is backed up by what is in fact the case (i.e. the 
external world), there is always open the possibility that one only appears to be seeing, believing or 
remembering correctly. 
 
There is scope for responding to Pears’ criticism here: According to Pears’ Wittgenstein, impressions 
alone are not a sufficiently reliable guide for establishing meaning. Checking sense-impressions against 
sense-impressions can never get to the truth, no matter how vast the tribunal of impression-based 
evidence one might appeal to. What is required is the confirmation of those impressions by reference to 
physical objects. In response, I would argue that Pears’ argument shows only that we are to admit that our 
recollections are fallible, and that we have no neat refutation against the spectre of full-blown memory/ 
impression/ belief scepticism. It does not show that one could not set up a language on the basis of 
impressions alone. Checking the train time-table that springs to one’s imagination is not conclusive 
evidence that one knows the right time. This is to be admitted. However, it may be that such images are 
the best one can hope for in the situation. Of course, it is no substitute for looking at the actual time-
table―looking at actual time-tables offer much firmer grounds for believing that a train will depart at the 
stated time. It is not immediately clear to me why a sense-data theory cannot maintain this distinction, just 
so long as we allow that ‘looking at the actual time-table’ is understood as occurring via a mental image, 
and does not of itself provide a cast-iron guarantee that the time-table is actual. In which case, such 
images are the best one can hope for in any situation. So we might argue in favour of Ayer, that his theory 
can maintain this distinction between having a memory and thinking (falsely) that one has a memory. And 
he can maintain that it is sometimes the case that one mistakes the two, and even makes those mistakes 
many times without realising it. Indeed, on this view, it is a coherent (if far-fetched) thought that all one’s 
memories are false. So long as one accepts these provisos about one’s fallibilism, then I see no problem 
endorsing the idea that we rely on impressions. Moreover, if memory were to be so utterly distrusted, it is 
difficult to see grounds for ever placing trust in our memories. Overall, reliance on memory/sense/belief-
impressions does not entail that the distinction between genuine and false memory collapses or that 
memory cannot be checked.  
 
Accepting this response, one further problem is bounced back for Pears’ Wittgenstein. Whereas the Ayer-
type view may be accused of failing to countenance the ordinary ways in which we make contact with the 
world, Pears’ Wittgenstein fails to countenance the ways in which we often struggle to make those 
connections, and ways we might altogether fail. It might be argued against Pears’ Wittgenstein that he fails 
to pay due heed to this fallibility. If sensation concepts are formed as a matter of reference to the physical 
world, then how to explain those cases where we are convinced that our concepts have been formed in 
such a fashion only to find out (or perhaps never finding out, as per the sceptic) that they only appear to 
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have done so. Ayer’s problem seems to be distinguishing real sensations in a world of supposed 
appearances, Pears’ problem, conversely, is being able to distinguish appearances in a world of supposed 
physical objects. One might wonder whether these are two sides of the same problematic coin (and I 
suggest as much in Part IV). If there are definitive problems with Ayer’s view, I think we should look for 
them elsewhere. 
 
Child presents a different argument. To this end, he quotes PI §258: 
 
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain 
sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for 
every day on which I have the sensation.―I first want to remark that a definition of the sign 
cannot be formulated.―But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.―How? Can 
I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and 
at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation―and so, as it were, point to it 
inwardly.―But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely 
serves to establish the meaning of a sign.―Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating 
of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the 
sensation.―But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I 
remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of 
correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that 
only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’. 
 
The language-game of sensation ‘S’ in §§258ff. discusses an attempt to establish the meaning of a new 
sensation word ‘S’ in a scenario where there is (i) no natural behaviour through which to express having S 
and (ii) no descriptive vocabulary through which to describe what S is, or what S is like. For example, it 
can’t be shown where the sensation occurs, by e.g. rubbing your arm or crying out etc., because this 
would be a part of natural expression, and so violate condition (i). And it can’t be said whether S is 
pleasant or painful, nor say how long it lasts for etc., because these are descriptive terms in a readily 
understandable public language, and so violate condition (ii). Wittgenstein regards S as an instance of 
logical privacy, and so too regards it as ultimately incoherent. 
 
According to Child, PI §258 has Wittgenstein opposing the idea that a sensation concept can be formed 
through the minimal conditions of having a sensation and consequent naming of it. Under this reading, 
sensation S is used by Wittgenstein as an ex-hypothesis example where we are to imagine the subject as 
drumming up a meaningful concept through the powers of introspection alone, by establishing correct 
use through ‘concentrating attention’ on a particular sensation and proposing to use the word ‘S’ to refer 
to all future instances of that type. The precise question of the section, as Child asks it, is: ‘what is it for 
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something to be the same kind of sensation as the one that was originally called ‘S’?’ (op. cit p.154). Here, 
we cannot just assume that there are preset standards by which we can establish what is to count as the 
same. Indeed, because ‘S’ is meant to be private, the individual cannot appeal to resources that are 
available in ordinary, public, language (ibid. p.156):  
 
it would not help [for the private linguist] to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he 
writes ‘S’, he has something ― and that is all that can be said. But ‘has’ and ‘something’ also 
belong to our common language (PI §261)22  
 
Rather, the private linguist is required to ‘conjure up absolutely everything he needs for defining his 
private words entirely from his own, introspective resources’ (ibid. p.157). And the idea that this is 
possible, Child claims, is for Wittgenstein ‘pure fantasy’ (ibid. p.157). 
 
But what is it about this situation that makes it so fantastical? Child thinks we should contrast what we 
can say about private colour concepts with what we can say about private sensation concepts. Similarly to 
the conclusions discussed in Part II, the self-formed colour concept is in principle communicable to 
anyone, given propitious circumstances. That is, it is possible to imagine that someone could set up 
meaningful practices for use of a colour-word without knowing how to communicate about it publically 
(ibid. p.157). What makes it possible to form such a concept, according to Child, is that colour concepts 
refer to a ‘relatively enduring property’ (ibid. p.158), so the individual will be able to form genuine 
distinctions between correct and incorrect applications, between the appearance of the colour on an 
occasion and the actual presence of the colour. The same stability, he argues, is not true of sensations. By 
contrast, Child claims that sensations are ‘simply too ephemeral’ (ibid. p.158) to afford us the possibility 
of formulating concepts about them in isolation from reference to external circumstances. 
 
Child argues that Wittgenstein provides this external reference in PI §270, with his example of the 
manometer. PI §270 is a development of the example of PI §258, where the subject is imagined to have 
learnt that whenever he has S there is an increase in his blood pressure. So the feeling of S is identified 
with rising blood pressure. This identification, Wittgenstein comments, ‘is a useful result’. For Child this 
means we have our required external cue: ‘what an S-type sensation is is the feeling of my blood 
pressure’s rising’ (Child, forthcoming, p.7). So, the next time the subject feels S again, he can comment 
that his blood pressure is rising. This is not to claim that sensations are behaviour, that the sensation is 
blood pressure rising. For Child, it really is meaningful to say that it is the feeling that matters: 
 
                                                          
22 Please note that I return to the topic of whether it really is the private linguist who is the correct subject of 
paraphrase in objection (f) of Part IV below. 
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Having an electric shock is not merely a physical and physiological phenomenon; a normally-
functioning person who is given a mild electric shock really does feel something; she has a 
sensation. (p.7) 
 
The point is restricted to the twin idea that a sensation cannot be conceived as something with an 
intrinsic, subjective, purely introspectible character, and that reference to the external environment is a 
constitutive part of what it is to experience the sensation. This result, if we are to believe Child’s 
interpretation, is what saves the sensation from ephemerality, and affords it a stable basis upon which to 
conceptualise what S is all about. The next time the subject feels S again, he can reliably comment that his 




Expressivist interpretations of the PLA: 
 
There is a question regarding what consequences we might expect from acknowledging a necessary tie 
between sensation concepts and external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour. As argued, externalists 
believe that sensation concepts are necessarily tied to external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour. 
Under this view, it is natural to suppose that the character of the tie should in some way reflect the 
dynamic between the behavioural expression and the concept which aims to characterise it. Expressivism is 
a natural corollary of externalism in this respect. Broadly speaking, expressivism defends the idea that 
meaningful expressions of sensation concepts―or, avowals―are such in virtue of the concepts relation 
with the behavioural expression of the felt sensation. Expressivism is set in contrast to ‘descriptivism’, 
which defines that relation in terms of the expressed concept being the result of some introspective 
process of identifying the sensation and reporting on it. Both Pears and Child defend expressivist 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s positive view of the relation between sensations and sensation concepts 
(Child, 2011, pp.166-175, Pears, 2006, pp.55-7). Quoting Wittgenstein:  
 
Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of 
the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults 
talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behaviour. 
“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?―on the contrary: the verbal 
expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. (PI §244) 
 
Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, 
instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an 
45 
 
auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of 
primitive behaviour. (Z §545) 
 
Expressivist interpretations are represented strongly in the literature, from a variety of perspectives (see 
Ginet (1968), Fogelin (1987), Hacker (e.g. 1993a, 1993b), Wright (1998), and Bar-On (2004)). It would be 
mistaken to think these commentators defend one uniform set of views on the matter; far from it. Even 
so, I think we may distinguish two broad versions: strong expressivism and nuanced expressivism. 
According to the strong expressivist interpretation, avowals are better considered as the embodiment of the 
behaviour, rather than a report of it. In this manner, behaviour is part of the concept. So whilst we use 
words in such situations, we could just as well have groaned, grimaced, or pulled facial expressions, for 
this is ultimately the same thing. As Fogelin puts it: 
 
Crying is not a report about our feelings of pain, but an expression of them … the same can 
be said for the remark “I have a pain in my arm”. Saying this is also part of our pain 
behaviour, not a comment upon it (1987, p.170).  
 
What makes this interpretation strong, is that avowals are considered as so tightly tied to natural 
behavioural expression, that they are entirely dependent upon them. In order for there to be an avowal, 
there must be behavioural expression (though, of course, this isn’t the case vice versa). Fogelin pays only 
lip-service to their conceptual separability (ibid. p.240, footnote 1), but emphasises that: 
 
Wittgenstein speaks of “one possibility” [§244] for the explanation of sensation talk, but 
nowhere offers any other, and the things he says next [§§245-6, §§256ff.] presuppose that 
something very like this account must be correct (ibid. pp.169-70).  
 
And Fogelin certainly proceeds by assuming that Wittgenstein only really ever had this one possibility in 
mind. In a similarly strong interpretation, Bar-On argues that, for Wittgenstein, first-person avowals are ‘in 
no way thought to represent or be epistemically grounded in a subject’s judgement or belief about some state 
of affairs’ (Bar-On, 2004, p.230). That is, they do not serve to describe one’s present condition in the first 
place. Thus: 
 
[I]t is misguided to regard the special status of avowals as a consequence of their 
recognitional access that subjects have to their own states of mind, and there is no need to 
seek any secure epistemic basis on which avowals are made. (ibid. p.231)  
 
For Bar-On’s Wittgenstein, avowals are not based on a process of recognition and report, but expressions 
of the sensation itself. As expressions, avowals are inherently open to view instead of hidden away to be 
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inferred of or surmised about; they display their meaning, not provide a report on it. As such, it is ‘as 
inappropriate, conceptually speaking, to assess their epistemic credentials as it would be to assess a moan 
or cry or a laugh in terms of its evidence, correctness, or reasons’ (ibid. p.231).  
 
There are problems with such strong views. As Bar-On argues, this form of expressivism struggles to 
account for the semantics of avowals as they are employed in conditionals and other indirect senses, (see 
Bar-On’s extension of the Frege-Geach objection to expressivism (ibid. p.233-40)). Moreover, 
expressivism has a problem in accounting for avowals relating to complex inner experiences. For 
example, suppose I avow that I am currently feeling mildly smug that my opponent resigned in our game 
of chess the previous Thursday. It is difficult to see how this feeling can clearly translate into a type of 
behavioural expression. And even if we can, there is a question regarding why we would want to, when 
the simpler explanation is that I am simply describing how I feel. Furthermore, not all sensations are 
nearly as intense as feeling pain. Rather, it seems that some avowals are capable of being reported; one 
can coolly relay that they are feeling relaxed in a bath, and describe that they are experiencing pleasurable 
feelings without having to translate those avowals into an instance of natural behaviour expression. That 
is, it seems to be part of the ‘depth grammar’ (PI §664) that on at least some occasions avowals are 
reports, not expressions. If this is acceptable, then avowals and behavioural expression are not tied up in 
the way the strong expressivist maintains.  
 
There is, however, a weaker interpretation of Wittgenstein’s supposed expressivism, which avoids many 
of the problems faced by the strong expressivist. This nuanced expressivism is explicitly defended by both 
Child and Hacker. The nuance is not to claim that all avowals are only expressions of behaviour. Instead, 
avowals are understood as grounded or ‘rooted in’ natural expressive behaviour: 
 
The vast majority of our desires have no natural, prelinguistic behavioural expression; but 
their expression is nevertheless rooted in the primitive behaviour of striving to get or crying 
for something or other ... Once the primitive linguistic extension is grafted onto the natural 
expressive behaviour, further linguistic extensions grow. For the mastery of a language opens 
up the possibility of ever more subtle, refined, and linguistically differentiated pain-behaviour 
(Hacker, 1993b p.92). 
 
Nuanced expressivism is weaker than strong expressivism insofar as it does not tie avowals directly to 
current expressive behaviours. Rather, the tie may be recognised only via some very indirect link back to 
natural expressions. As long as somewhere in the history of the use of an avowal there is some contact 
with natural expressive behaviour, then there is no issue with the avowal being many steps removed from 
it. Importantly however, the inclusion of linguistic extensions enables those original expressive behaviours 
to develop in a vast number of directions. Linguistic extensions not only allow us to divorce our use of 
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sensation concepts from the direct expression of sensation behaviours, but allow us to generate wholly 
new experiences altogether; experiences that are unavailable to those without the requisite linguistic 
capabilities. As Child exemplifies:   
 
the budding wine connoisseur’s acquisition of a sophisticated vocabulary for describing the 
tastes of different wines goes hand in hand with her coming to experience wines in richer, 
more complex ways. It is not that she learns to describe more accurately the experiences that 
she already has; rather she comes to have different experiences (2011, p.173) 
 
Nuanced expressivism can readily accommodate for these semantic features of avowals—it can explain 
their use in conditional statements, their ability to be coolly reported on, the complex games we learn how 
to play with them etc. There is no requirement to try and force a translation of avowals into natural 
expressive behaviour.  
 
This weaker tie undoubtedly better reflects the sophisticated ways in which expressive behaviour relates 
to use. Nuanced expressivism twinned with externalism results in a detailed set of views attributed to 
Wittgenstein’s opinions on the philosophy of mind and psychology. It is one that keeps an eye open to 
both the organic nature and ‘primitive’ origins of language and meaning (Z §545), but also to the 




Objections to externalism and nuanced expressivism: 
 
Whilst I fully agree with Child’s unorthodox view that Wittgenstein is no opponent of phenomenal 
concepts, I disagree with his positive proposal for how Wittgenstein would characterise them. In the rest 
of Part III, I provide reasons to suspect that the externalist interpretation is not in itself a convincing 
argument. In Part IV, I suggest that externalism is not representative of Wittgenstein’s actual thinking on 





If sensation concepts are meaningful in virtue of their ties to external circumstances, physiology, or 
behaviour, then a sensation without such ties is, by this definition, not meaningful. And this is indeed the 
conclusion that the externalist draws from the PLA. One example which might run counter to this line of 
thinking is generalised anxiety. Diagnosed as a medical condition or ‘disorder’, generalised anxiety may be 
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regarded as a feeling, but a feeling that is not directed towards any particular object or circumstance, and 
seems to arise ‘for no apparent reason’;23 it is, as its name suggests, a ‘generalised’ feeling. In this way it is 
unlike e.g. ‘tingling’, which is caused by something externally determinate, i.e. an electric shock. It is not 
clear what external object or circumstance to which we can point to for generalised anxiety, or indeed 
whether there is such a cause. And yet, I will assume that generalised anxiety is a real phenomenon. 
 
One response might be to deny that there are no underlying external cues which bring the feeling about. 
There may be physiological causes due to hormone imbalances, or more macroscopic causes such as 
unrealised work stresses or lifestyle dissatisfaction. This response is of course highly controversial, and 
there is scant room to go into it in appropriate depth here. I will only suggest that I am not convinced 
that all cases of generalised anxiety can be so easily reduced in these ways. Another response might be to 
reject the idea that generalised anxiety has no external cause, instead suggesting that it has many. In other 
words, the generality of the anxiety is such that it is to be recognised as a result of a great number of 
anxieties relating to various external causes formed under one banner. I think this is a more promising 
line, although a credible answer will perhaps only be fully realisable through the results of careful 
psychological studies. I am no psychologist and so will only comment, with reservation, that it is well-
known that attempts are often made to tackle external causes supposedly contributing to the anxious 
mental state, only for the individual to return to that state without those causes. In which case, we might 
think that those supposed factors are perhaps only superficially related to the underlying sense of 
anxiety―they are a consequence of the generalised anxiety as opposed to its cause. An alternative 
response might be that the generalised feeling of anxiety may yet be ‘rooted in’ naturally expressive 
behaviours, even if it is not an immediate expression of them. I think this story can be told, and with 
some plausibility. For example, we can readily imagine some primitive sources for feelings of anxiety, 
arising perhaps as an evolutionary response to life on the plains of the Serengeti, in order to avoid dangers 
of potential predators. Or we might interpret a baby’s crying as a natural expression of anxiety at his 
parent’s departure. These primitive bases may serve as the original mould from which more sophisticated 
forms of anxiety arise, such as those well expressed by modern thinkers, Durkheim’s anomie for instance, 
or perhaps Kierkegaardian angst. This may be right. Even so, I think it is a fair question to ask why we 
should expect that the connection with some long-distant conceptual ancestry has much to do with 
explaining generalised anxiety as experienced in its more sophisticated form. The link might very well be 
there, but it doesn’t explain very much. If the reason for bringing it in rests only in the desire to avoid 
objections, then this is ad hoc and therefore a bad reason. I am not suggesting that this is the reason. I am 
unsure what the reason might be. As such, I move on in the hope that other objections lend support to 
the claim that we need not appeal to conceptual ancestry in order to explain the semantics of phenomena 
such as generalised anxiety. 
                                                          








My second objection centres on Child’s claim that private sensations are ‘simply too ephemeral’ to act as 
reliable sources from which we might construct sensation concepts. As discussed earlier, Child contrasts 
sensations with colour experiences (see ibid. pp.157-9). Colour experiences, it is argued, do offer a 
sufficient basis from which to construct colour concepts. This is supposedly because colour experiences, 
unlike sensations, possess a ‘relatively enduring property’. This durability enables them to be compared 
with other objects of the same colour, it allows one to order objects inasmuch as they accurately match 
that colour, and so on (ibid. p.158). Private sensations, Child argues, are quite different: 
 
...a private sensation is available for inspection only as long as he can hold it in his attention; 
he cannot then retrieve the very same sensation and consider its qualities again. Nor can he 
compare the features of one private sensation with those of another that is enjoyed at a 
different time ... [T]here is nothing to sustain the practices of sorting and classification that 
would be needed if the private linguist were to be able to establish standards of correctness 
for the use of his private sensation words (ibid. pp.158-9) 
 
In short, it is not possible to ‘retrieve the very same sensation’ or compare it with new candidate private 
sensations. The sensation is too ephemeral for that.  
 
An important point of contention is why private sensations must be regarded as ephemeral. I do not see 
why they need to be. If the sensation is capable of having an impact on the subject, enough so that its 
occurrence is registered in the first place, then why should the subject be incapable of recognising it when 
it, or a similar such experience, appears again? One might think of how this is possible with non-private 
sensations. Many non-private sensations intuitively qualify as lively enough to remember after having 
been experienced just once; for example, eating an extra hot chilli, having a toothache, or perhaps the 
early stages of falling in love. These sensations, though in various ways fleeting, are lively and durable 
enough such that if they have chance to arise again, one will be able to think e.g. “Ah, I’ve felt that 
before”. That is, one will be more than capable of recognising the new sensation as the same or similar in 
kind to the one experienced the first time around. Such sensations are anything but ephemeral. 
 
So what should make private sensations any different? Why can’t they be remembered? The natural answer 
for Child has to be that non-private sensations have ties to external circumstances which provide the 
basis upon which they are remembered. E.g., the sensation of heat is tied to the chillies, the toothache is 
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tied to the tooth, and one’s love is tied to one’s lover. S, we are to imagine, has nothing external by which 
to remember it by and therefore slips away every time we might wish to capture it.  
 
One question to pursue is to ask whether the idea of experiencing an acceptably non-private sensation 
without its external counterpart makes it any less conceivable. It seems to me that we should not 
immediately expect this to be the case. After all, the sensation surely still feels the same: the heat still feels 
hot, the toothache still painful. It is just that now such feelings arise and dissolve without interventions 
from external influences. If this is imaginable, then I fail to see what is wrong with the thought that 
sensations might have ever only arose in that way. And if we can imagine that, then we are imagining a 
meaningful concept without external manifestation; something which the externalist suggests that we 
cannot do. 
 
A similar criticism was put forward in an objection to behaviourism by Putnam in the early nineteen-
sixties. (So far as I can see, the objection applies equally well to behaviourism as it does to externalism). 
Putnam sought to defend the idea that: 
 
From the statement that ‘X has a pain’ by itself no behavioural statement followsnot even 
a behavioural statement with a ‘normally’ or a ‘probably’ in it (1968, p.9).  
 
To this end, he asks us to imagine a community, he calls them the ‘Super-Spartans’, where the inhabitants 
feel pain sensations but do not behaviourally express them or report on them in any way. One feels pain, 
one may even give a secret name to it, but one does not, and will not ever, express it to anyone else. 
(They might even wonder “Who knows, perhaps all the other Super-Spartans have the same thing”, but 
of course they would never express this). Putnam’s point is that, for all its peculiarity, there is nothing 
contradictory or incoherent about this scenario. Again, the example represents how we can imagine 
meaningful concept acquisition and application without external manifestation. 
 
One response to these objections might be that imagining a non-private sensation without its usual 
external ties is different from trying to imagine a sensation that has been in total isolation from them 
from the very beginning. When imagining pain without external ties, we (as philosophers conceiving the 
scenario), can make sense of it. It is just feeling a pain without external manifestation. Borrowing from PI 
§257: ‘what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word “pain”; it shews the post where 
the new word is stationed’. In other words, we can use the ordinarily-understood grammar of the concept 
‘pain’ and apply it to a case where the grounds on which the concept is formed are altered. This is why it 
is not difficult to imagine. However, this option is not available to the logically private sensation. The 
private sensation has no such ordinary grammatical ‘post’ to begin with and so cannot be stationed 
elsewhere. This is why S cannot be imagined. S fundamentally differs from unexpressible pain sensations 
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due to its lack of an original station. However, this station is not determined as a result of a lack of 
external ties. If what I have argued above is correct, it is still the case that one can strip away all the 
externals and retain the feeling. We can imagine the occurrence of a sensation independently from its 
external circumstance, and we can imagine forming a phenomenal concept in response even though there 
is nothing external to support those cognitive activities. If this is so, then it is mistaken to think that 
unexpressible pain sensations are incoherent. As the non-private cases demonstrate, a central component 
of constructing a sensation concept is how the sensation feels intrinsically. These issues are further discussed 




Objection 3:  
 
Let us suppose that the previous two objections miss their target. Here is another: As discussed earlier, 
Child claims that ‘tingling’ is a word tied up with external circumstances, specifically with having an 
electric shock. And this thought is maintained even in the wake of a scenario where it is not possible to 
communicate what one means to others―all that is required is the right external contact. We might 
object, however, that even if external circumstances are necessary, they do little to explain the phenomenal 
character of phenomenal concepts. The concern is that even if there must be external ties, the ties have 
little explanatory force in the face of the stark fact that the sensation feels a (distinctive) kind of way. If the 
externalities cannot perform this explanatory function, then a full explanation of those concepts must lie 
somewhere else. And for this we need to include reference to the intrinsic feel of the sensation. 
 
The bizarre thought-experiments involving zombies and wholesale colour spectrum inversions have been 
variously designed to provide objection to the idea that external circumstances can tell us all there is to 
tell about the content of sensations and experiences. The uniting idea is that: for all that external 
circumstances can tell us about sensations and experiences, they cannot tell us everything. There is always 
the possibility that something is different, that something diverges, from what we ordinarily take it to be. 
Chalmers (1996) and Kirk (1999) discuss zombies, imagining a scenario where nobody except for oneself 
possesses phenomenal character, even though others display all relevant behaviours to suspect that they 
do. Shoemaker (1982) and Block (2007) explicitly use the example of widespread spectrum inversion to 
object to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In Block’s argument in favour of widespread colour inversion, he 
provides an elaborate thought-experiment. We are asked to imagine the following: a person grows up 
with normal colour vision. He then has an operation which alters his colour vision, things that previously 
appeared red now appear green and vice versa. The person then goes about his life, and learns to apply 
the terms red and green as he had done before the operation; he never calls the grass ‘red’, or the sunset 
‘green’, and so forth. Over time, he comes to use the words ‘red’ and ‘green’ as familiarly as he had done 
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before, even though he is, in fact, seeing invertedly. Finally, the poor person suffers amnesia and so 
forgets his earlier experience, including the operation. At this stage, the individual uses ordinary language 
in just the way everybody else does, his behaviour is indistinguishable from those who are not colour 
inverted, and he has no way of telling that he is inverted. He has no reason (so far as he knows) to suspect 
that he has ever been inverted, and so on. Nevertheless, his spectrum is, in fact, inverted. He still sees red 
where everybody else sees green and vice versa (ibid. pp.91-95). 
 
In defending a Wittgenstein argument against these objections, Child writes the following: 
 
What individuates sensations? What makes a sensation the kind of sensation it is? When we 
reflect on that question, Wittgenstein thinks, we find it natural to think that sensations are 
individuated by their subjective, introspectible character. And we find it natural to think that 
its subjective character is a purely intrinsic feature of a sensation: a feature whose identity is 
entirely independent of anything to do with the subject’s behaviour or external 
circumstances. So, we think, it is perfectly possible for two people to be subject to all the 
same external stimuli, and to be exactly alike in every behavioural respect, but for the 
subjective character of their sensations to be entirely different: it is possible, for example, 
‘that one section of mankind [has] one visual impression of red, and another section another’ 
(PI §272) ... Such a view of sensations has been dominant in the history of philosophy; and it 
is popular in contemporary philosophy. And, Wittgenstein thinks, it exerts a natural appeal 
on anyone who reflects on the nature of sensations; though, as we shall see, he thinks the 
appeal of this view depends on misunderstanding the ‘grammar’ of our sensation language. 
(Child, op. cit. pp.151-152) 
 
According to Child’s Wittgenstein, the idea that wholesale inverted spectra are possible is based on a 
misunderstanding of the true ‘grammar’ of sensations. As we have seen, this ‘grammar’ is argued to 
necessarily involve extension to external stimuli.  The ‘natural’ way to think is misguided. 
 
Other Wittgensteinians defend Wittgenstein against the examples in different ways. Horwich argues that 
if the possibility of wholesale spectrum inversion is raised ‘relative to normal conditions, and with respect 
to ordinary language characterisations of experience, the answer is, trivially, that there is no such 
possibility’ (2012, p.204). If, however, the question is raised relative to the philosopher’s supposed ‘private 
experiences’ then the question is revealed to be a pseudo-question because ‘there are no such private 
qualities and private terms’ (ibid. p.204). Non-normal conditions do not count because these are 
conditions philosophers mistakenly try to impose on the basis of a faulty assumption about the privacy of 




...if spectrum inversion were widespread, the terms we use in reporting how we experience 
colour would, as he puts it, ‘lose their use’ ... If spectrum inversion were widespread, there 
would be no agreement about how to use colour terms in describing one’s experience ... 
Without any agreement on which usages count as normal, talk of how things look with 
respect to colour will be meaningless (2008, p.37) 
 
For Kilverstein’s Wittgenstein, if spectrum inversion were a live possibility, then reports on experience 
would ‘lose their use’ because nobody would agree about what how to use colour terms correctly and so 
such talk would become ‘meaningless’. Tanney argues against the idea that there could be a physical, 
functional and behavioural duplicate (a zombie) that somehow lacked consciousness. She argues that once 
we provide a detailed behavioural explanation of the supposed zombie, it is difficult to make sense of just 
what the zombie is supposedly lacking (2004, pp.176-8). Shoemaker appeals to Wittgenstein’s remark at 
PI §272: 
 
The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own 
exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The 
assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had 
one sensation of red and another section another. 
 
Shoemaker claims this remark is intended to represent a ‘reductio ad absurdum of the notion of ‘private 
experience’ ... that it implies that this ‘assumption’ might be true’ (1982, p.328). See also Child’s take on PI 
§272 in the previous quotation, and Horwich (op cit., p.204 ft.30) for similar interpretations. All agree 
that Wittgenstein is here talking ex hypothesis.  
 
I think this is wrong. Unless one is already persuaded by the externalist interpretation, there is less reason 
to regard Wittgenstein as fundamentally (in principle) opposed to zombies or widespread spectrum 
inversion. Moreover, I think we can appeal to textual remarks to defend the view that Wittgenstein was 
not necessarily opposed to the possibility of widespread spectrum inversion or zombies. As I read PI 
§272, Wittgenstein is here genuinely conceding that it is possible (though unverifiable) ‘for one section of 
mankind’ to experience one colour and another section another colour. The ‘essential thing’ is not 
whether ‘each person possesses their own exemplar’, it is whether people are concerned about it. 
Kilverstein’s worry depends on the idea that widespread inversion would have to have practical 
implications on practices, such that if there were such inversion, there would be no agreement. It seems 
to me, however, that there could very well be widespread inversion in co-existence with agreement in the 
use of colour terms. It would just be (unbeknownst to the participants) that the agreement was based on 
false premises. The practice need not break down simply in virtue of the possibility. What matters (again, 
the ‘essential thing’) is whether the individuals who co-operate in those practices allow the possibility of 
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inversion to overrun them. But the answer to this is not determined on a priori grounds, but according to 
whether the ‘forms of life’ that use them are concerned enough about it (e.g. PI §217). Certainly in our 
practices, the thought is relatively inane; it might be the case, but “so what?” I would argue that the 
possibility is, for Wittgenstein, a live one, but, frankly speaking, it doesn’t matter enough to let it disrupt 
our lives. If it did, the practice of colour identification probably wouldn’t last long. 
 
If Wittgenstein is theoretically indifferent to the possibility of widespread colour inversion, then this 
suggests that we can see it as having a role within ordinary language (albeit a fairly exotic branch thereof). 
If this is so, we have grounds for rejecting Horwich’s presentation of the matters, which depends on the 
idea that such scepticism is not part of our ‘normal conditions’. If by ‘normal’ Horwich thinks we should 
be restricted to considering only mundane everyday thoughts and conversations (or something of the 
sort), then I think he attributes to Wittgenstein too strict a conception of what counts as ‘normal’. Many 
thoughts and ideas that arise in ordinary (non-philosophical) life stray beyond the mundane, and it would 
be Orwellian to suggest that meaningful language must be confined within those reaches. A zebra wearing 
a Mexican hat surfing on an ironing board is not a ‘normal’ thought, but is well within the bounds of 
ordinary language and thought; perhaps spectrum inversions and philosophical zombies are no less 
bizarre. As will be defended in Part IV, these kinds of thoughts are of a different category to what we are 
asked to imagine when imagining sensation S; S is not just bizarre, it is plain incoherent. And this is what 
makes it a genuine instance of a logically private language. However, more on this later. 
 
Consider the following remark relating to the possibility of zombies: 
 
But can’t I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even 
though they behave in the same way as usual? – If I imagine it now – alone in my room – I 
see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business – the idea is perhaps a 
little uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this idea in your ordinary intercourse with others, 
in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example, “The children over there are mere automata; 
all their liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either find these words becoming quite 
meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of 
this sort. (PI, §420) 
 
What can be noted is how readily Wittgenstein concedes to the possibility of zombies in the first two 
sentences. If he regarded the idea as incoherent, he would be likely to have pointed it out. But he doesn’t; 
rather he opposes it on the grounds that it is simply something that we cannot maintain with seriousness 
outside of philosophical reflection on those matters. In this sense we might read the passage as Humean 
in its concession to the logic of sceptical thought, as measured against the fact that our nature compels us 
to believe regardless. Importantly, Wittgenstein’s response is not to answer the problem of other minds 
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by justifying our beliefs. Neither is it to suggest that the consideration is somehow incoherent. As with the 
response to colour inversion, the main flaw in the example is its inability to purchase a grip on us; it is not 
that we cannot make sense of it. In this manner, I think we might read Wittgenstein as allowing that such 
examples have a place in our practices, even if only for a relatively circumscribed time, with little genuine 
force. 
 
There are further remarks which display a similar attitude in response to privacy and accessibility issues. 
We can see this at play in the discussion between PI §§273-278. For instance, Wittgenstein asks the 
question:  
 
What am I to say about the word “red”?―that it means something ‘confronting us all’ and 
that everyone should really have another word, besides this one, to mean his own sensation of 
red? (PI §273) 
 
Note that he never answers this question. And in PI §§277-8, Wittgenstein admits that there is a sense to 
which our concepts refer to private colour sensations, known only to ourselves: 
 
But how is it even possible for us to be tempted to think that we use a word to mean at one 
time the colour known to everyone―and at another the ‘visual impression’ which I am 
getting now? ... When I mean the colour impression that (as I should like to say) belongs to 
me alone I immerse myself in the colour. (PI §277) 
 
“I know how the colour green looks to me”―surely that makes sense!―Certainly: what use of 
the proposition are you thinking of? (PI §278) 
 
As PI §278 remarks, if a coherent story can be told regarding the use of propositions about private 
colours, then Wittgenstein is open to hearing it. My suggestion is that accounts of zombies or Block’s 
example of spectrum inversion do represent just those kinds of stories. 
 
One final remark, Z §536: 
 
I may know that he is in pain, but I never know the exact degree of his pain. So here is 
something that he knows and that his expression of pain cannot tell me. Something purely 
private.  
 
In the parenthesis to this remark, Wittgenstein does criticise the idea that there has to be reference to 
‘degrees of pain’ within our concept of pain. Some uses make no reference to degree. I think this is right. 
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We often don’t use the term with such a precise measure in mind. On the other hand, we can equally 
imagine how this is sometimes, indeed potentially often, the case. It can be admitted to be fairly ordinary 
to suppose that our knowledge of others pains is only an approximation, that we sometimes get it 
wrong, or that we sometimes fail to realise the intensity of others feelings. Again, such considerations 
lead us to suppose that externalities will not take us ‘all the way’ in terms of understanding the internal 
states of others. 
 
Overall, the appellation of Wittgenstein as an externalist forces commentators to oppose spectrum 
inversion and zombie examples. In my view, the examples are coherent, and they do represent a 
challenge to externalist theories. It would be a mistake to oppose the idea that the most important thing 
about sensations precisely is their ‘purely intrinsic feature’, that is, how they feel to the subject. This feature 
is integral to the grammar of the concept of sensation. As a consequence, the inverted spectrum is 
possible, zombies are conceivable. If Wittgenstein objects to these consequences, then I believe he is in 
big trouble. However, I don’t see why we should regard Wittgenstein as in principle opposed to zombies 
or inverted spectra, or to other less far-fetched examples where externally undetectable differences are 
less dramatically conceived. A Wittgensteinian can allow that zombies and inverted spectra give an 
insight into the sort of access and inaccessibility we have to others, and our epistemic boundaries, whilst 
also recognising that these insights are the thin edge of a wedge, when it comes to understanding our 
mental lives more widely. 
 
 
To summarise the desired aims of Part III: If the argument is so far on track, then Wittgenstein should 
not attempt to tie sensation concepts to external circumstances, physiology, or behaviour in the manner 
suggested by the externalist interpretation. There are ready examples where the extrinsic can be separated 
from the intrinsic without loss of meaning. None of this is to contradict that Wittgenstein is correct to 
emphasise that there is a tie. In fact, it is entirely fair to say that Wittgenstein was a master of descriptive 
psychology, at discussing the intricate relations between behaviour and our use of concepts. However, if 
his philosophy of psychology extends to the claim that there must be such a tie, then I believe he is 
mistaken for the reasons given above. An essential aspect of our understanding of sensations and 




PART IV: Logical privacy, non-logical privacy and the real target of the PLA 
 
In this section, I finally move on to my attempt to positively answer the questions about what counts as 
logical privacy, what counts as non-logical privacy and therefore about what the overall point of the PLA 
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really is. Contrary to widespread interpretation, I argue that Wittgenstein intended the logical privacy of 
sensation S to be contrasted with the privacy of sensations without external counterpart. Under my reading, 
unextended pain sensations do not represent instances of logical privacy. I also attempt to provide a 
positive take on what non-logical privacy amounts to, when we include the idea that external 
circumstances don’t explain everything. I suggest that recognising the sense in which privacy is a part of 






According to my reading of the PLA, the first genuine example of a truly logical private language is the 
introduction of sensation S at PI §258. As such, and in opposition to the externalist interpretation, 
unexpressible pain sensations are not examples of logical privacy. The chief difference, which I shall go on 
to discuss, is that whereas unexpressible pains are coherent, the point about purportedly logically private 
sensations is that they are, ultimately, incoherent. This shift in emphasis leads to a different treatment of who 
Wittgenstein regards as mistaken in their attempt to characterise S as a sensation, and why they fail. 
 
Arguing for an externalist or expressivist interpretation relies on accepting the premise that Wittgenstein’s 
early remarks about pain in the PLA (e.g. PI §§244-6, 256-7) are to be considered comparatively to his 
remarks about the logically private language, specifically with sensation S (PI §§243, 258ff.). Wittgenstein 
is regarded as saying that the idea of there being a concept ‘pain’ without expressive behaviour is similar 
to what he says about sensation S. Hacker, for instance, comments upon the conclusions drawn in PI 
§261, a remark exclusively about sensation S, by explicit comparison to PI §257, a remark about pain: 
 
The private ostensive definition of the word ‘S’ in the private language cannot be identified 
as a definition of a sensation-word by invoking the grammar of ‘sensation’ in the public 
language to determine the grammatical post at which ‘S’ is to stand (cf. §257). (Hacker, 
1993b, p.5) 
 
The comparison is evident at the end of the quote: ‘(cf. §257)’. Hacker takes Wittgenstein to be arguing 
against the idea that the words ‘pain’ and ‘S’ could mean anything in a scenario where there is no way to 
ever express in what circumstances one has S or pain. Both ‘S’ and ‘pain’ are equivalently meaningless 
insofar as  saying or thinking that you have S or have pain by using a word ‘S’ or ‘pain’ solely by virtue of 
naming (ostensively defining) the supposed sensation in isolation from any outward display of those 
sensations, is senseless. Hacker claims that Wittgenstein’s indulgence of the language-game where there is 
pain but no pain expression is to be understood as something considered only ex hypothesis possible; it is 
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indulged in, in order to show how upon investigation it doesn’t make sense (ibid. p.59). One cannot 
imagine the word ‘pain’ being meaningful in a world where there is no pain expression or where there is 
no external circumstance to which one can tie the sensation to. Therefore, for Hacker, the example of 
pain in §257 is similar to when Wittgenstein indulges in the possibility of a logically private language such 
as sensation S even though he really believes this to be impossible also. Both the example of 
unexpressible pain concepts and the example of sensation S are to be understood comparatively, and both 
are regarded as examples of logically private concepts. 
 
My main exegetical contention is that the externalist interpretation draws the wrong conclusions about 
the relation between what is said in PI §§244-6 and §§256-7 about exhibiting pain behaviour, and what is 
said about sensation ‘S’ in PI §§258ff. In short, I argue that §§244-6 and 256-7 are more illuminatingly 
considered in contrast to §§258ff. §257 focuses on what it would be like to be in a world where the relation 
between the concept pain and the outward expression of it is broken. §258 focuses on an example where 
one tries to name a sensation that is logically incommunicable. If I am correct, these are two very 
different investigations. 
 
Under my reading, Wittgenstein is asking us to contrast sensation S with what has so far been said about 
the imaginability of pain sensations. Sensation S is a purported ‘sensation’ that bears no connection to any 
sensation concept we do understand. Given this starting premise, if we try to talk of sensation S as a 
sensation, if we try to justify it even as a sensation instead of, say, an emotion or a thought, we either (a) 
begin introducing ways in which the sensation is no longer an instance of logical privacy―insofar as it is 
now bearing connections with other concepts we do understand. Or (b), our introduction of it as a 
sensation becomes incoherent―as Wittgenstein says, to say so much even as ‘that one ‘has’ it is’ (§261) 
brings it away from the logically private domain, so presumably one can’t even say of it this much. The 
result is that we can’t conceive calling something a sensation that bears no relation to what we really in fact 
recognise as a sensation. This example contrasts with pain that is unexpressible or untied to external 
circumstance insofar as that sensation is still understood as feeling a certain kind of way, and so bears 
those connections with other concepts that S lacks. Sensation S doesn’t succeed in getting this far in our 
imaginations. And it is this that separates acceptable (and understandable) privacy, from genuine logical 
privacy. The externalist’s mistake is to conflate these two kinds. 
 
I offer six reasons to justify my contrastive interpretation, hoping that each reason somewhat lends support 
to the others:  
 
(a) It is noteworthy that pain is explicitly discussed from §244-257, but is not further discussed until 
much later (with the one brief exception of §263). §§258-271 concern ‘S’, and then Wittgenstein 
moves onto a discussion about colour experience for a number of sections up to §280. Only then 
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does the example of pain return at §281, and even then only in a context where he is discussing 
behaviourism (§§281-88). So why ought we to suppose that the remarks about pain are similar, in 
the above mentioned manner, to the remarks about S, especially as Wittgenstein nowhere himself 
draws the parallel? 
 
(b) §257 itself may be read as a response to the interlocutors attempted understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s position, which is stated at the very beginning of the section: 
 
[Interlocutor’s voice attempting to emulate Wittgenstein’s:] “What would it be like if human 
beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be 
impossible to teach a child the use for the word ‘tooth-ache’”. 
 
The rest of the section seems clearly written in the form of an attempt for Wittgenstein to redress 
the interlocutor’s misappropriation of his own views; and notice that the interlocutor’s remarks 
are distinctly externalist. Wittgenstein might well be read as pre-empting and rejecting such a 
position in this very section.  
 
Hacker muddies the division between what the interlocutor is saying and what Wittgenstein is 
saying in §257 (op cit. pp.59-60). As mentioned above, he treats Wittgenstein’s response to the 
interlocutor as being that of getting him to consider more foundational difficulties than just being 
unable to teach the child the meaning of ‘tooth-ache’. He also puts in the interlocutor’s mouth 
the worry that the speaker in the example couldn’t communicate his thoughts to others (ibid. 
p.59). But only the above quoted remark is in “…” marks, indicating this to be the voice of the 
interlocutor, whereas the rest of the section is without them, and so one assumes that the 
consequent voice is that of Wittgenstein redressing the interlocutor, not the interlocutor himself. 
Throughout his exegesis of §257, Hacker repeatedly switches between the voice of the 
interlocutor and that of Wittgenstein in a way that does not tally with how it occurs in the text. 
 
(c) More attention should be paid to the fact that Wittgenstein nowhere outright denies that there is 
an experience of pain, nor that the child (being a genius) couldn’t invent a word for it, nor even 
that there isn’t a practice (given that there is a teacher), but only that it isn’t by fact outwardly 
expressed or expressible. He merely questions the point, or ‘purpose’, of naming ones pain in a 
world where you are never going to express it or communicate it to anyone. And he is right, what 
would be the point? But he nowhere states that you couldn’t in principle do it; he nowhere denies 
that the word you use to name the pain is still potentially understandable as meaning pain all the 
same. In short, he nowhere says this idea lacks sense. Sensation S on the other hand does lack sense. 
It fails to even get so far as to have a point or purpose. The failure to successfully imagine S is 
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not due to a lack of one’s imaginative powers, but due to a lack of a coherently-conceived idea 
being put forward in the first place. 
 
(d) Consider the last part of §257: 
 
When one says “He gave a name to his sensation” one forgets that a great deal of stage-
setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when 
we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of 
the grammar of the word “pain”; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. 
 
These are difficult remarks to break down. Hacker takes them to indicate that, for Wittgenstein, 
naming something necessarily requires a background or ‘stage-setting’ in order for the naming 
ceremony to meaningfully take place. As outlined above, he has in mind the stage-setting of 
behavioural expressions of pain; without these, the naming just doesn’t make sense.   
 
I do not think this interpretation takes proper account of the second sentence of the quoted 
remark, i.e.: when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the 
grammar of the word ‘pain’. As discussed in my second objection to externalism in Part III, this 
seems to indicate that Wittgenstein is clarifying what we do when we, qua philosophers looking 
at an imagined scenario, try to think of doing something like naming a pain (hence the ‘when we 
speak of’ aspect of the remark). When we, qua philosopher, think of this situation we 
immediately put into it our understanding of the grammar of the word ‘pain’ (something we all 
clearly understand). So the situation of §257 is perfectly imaginable; §257 represents only a case 
where there is no expression of pain amongst a community but where someone in that 
community somehow does this strange naming of pain and doesn’t tell anyone about it. 
Wittgenstein is saying that when we think of this, we immediately put forward some 
understanding of the situation.  As Wittgenstein says: ‘[the grammar of the word ‘pain’] shews the 
post where the new word is stationed’.  
 
We ought to contrast this situation with how we think about S. Trying to name an indefinable 
sensation, a sensation that occurs in isolation from anything we understand and any concept we 
possess, is meaningless, not because we can’t express it to others, but because we, qua 
philosophers, don’t even understand it ourselves. In short, S, unlike pain, precisely has no such 
‘post’. This is what makes it very different and a real instance of a case where ‘one doesn’t know 




(e) The immediately succeeding sections after §258 are remarks applicable only to sensation S, not 
the sensation of pain considered in §257. §261, for example, rejects the idea that the word ‘S’ can 
stand for a sensation, this is because the words ‘sensation’ and ‘has’ are words from the common 
stock of publically understandable language. One cannot say that S is like any other sensation, or 
that S feels a certain way, or even that it lasts for a certain period of time etc. because this stops it 
from being logically private in the requisite sense of §243. The point of sensation S is that it 
cannot be defined, and is logically incommunicable. This therefore includes defining it in terms 
such as ‘it is similar to a pain sensation, but less sharp, and also it feels somehow more pleasant’, 
for this puts it squarely back in a publically understood language. Wittgenstein even emphasises 
in the same section that one would just like to let out an inarticulate cry, but even this is 
something that occurs in an understandable language. Sensation S is unlike anything we’ve ever 
experienced. Contrast this with the pain example of §257. We know perfectly well what pain feels 
like, what it would be like for someone to feel pain but not express it, and so on. S cannot get 
nearly so far in our thoughts. 
 
(f) As mentioned in footnote 23 of Part III, Child’s suggested subject of paraphrase in PI §261 is 
that it is the private linguist who is incapable of imagining sensation S (2011, pp.156-7). The 
reason for the failure, as per Child, is that ‘sensations are too ephemeral’ and our memory and 
powers of introspection are not up to the task of remembering accurately. If this were so, the 
limitations are placed on the linguist himself; we might imagine that, were his introspective 
powers better, he may have been capable of forming a concept of the sensation.  
 
There is an alternative answer as regards to who is making the mistake about S here. In short, it is 
not the private linguist who is mistaken. Instead, I suggest the following: 
 
it would not help [for us, qua philosopher attempting to envisage the scenario,] to say that it 
need not be a sensation; that when he writes ‘S’, he has something ― and that is all that 
can be said. But ‘has’ and ‘something’ also belong to our common language. (PI 
§261) 
 
According to this view, by ‘us, qua philosopher attempting to envisage the scenario’, Wittgenstein is 
placing the limitations on our qua philosophers attempts to conceive the scenario successfully in the 
first place. And it is we who are being scrutinised. This turns the object of the investigation 
around; it is not an attempt to provide constraints and rules for how we (in ordinary life) use 
concepts but an attempt to criticise the way we qua philosophers attempt to explain those uses. The 
investigation is thus focused not on the concepts themselves, but on philosopher’s 




In this way, we can regard the PLA not as a proof negating the possibility of a private language. 
Rather, it is as Stern (whose views bear some semblance with my own) puts it: ‘Wittgenstein’s 
principal aim is to get us to see that we only seem to understand the notion of a private language: 
that it falls apart on closer examination. In other words, we don’t understand the notion of a 
private language well enough to be able to clearly state its nature, and then argue from such a 
premise to a conclusion concerning the impossibility of such a language’ (2010, p.50, also see his 
2004, p.174). 
  
The opposition, then, is to the idea that we can conceive of S in the first place. It isn’t as if were 
his introspective abilities any better the private linguist would be able to form a credible sensation 
concept with S. Rather, it is mistaken to think that there is a genuine naming of a sensation going 
on in the first place. A sensation is a concept that is meaningful in virtue of its place within a 
publically understood language, and when one tries to strip away all those elements of it that 
make it meaningful in the first place, one cannot retain the idea of a meaningful concept. This is a 
general constrain on what it is for a concept to have meaning: I cannot claim to have bought a 
‘car’, but when asked to describe it, I say that it is a car with no wheels, not made of metal, has no 
seats or steering wheel, it cannot be driven, it has no engine, no make or model etc. In this 
instance, when I strip away all those elements which make up my concept ‘car’ and still aim to 
retain there being some sense to the notion, it is ultimately I who am mistaken in determining it 
as a car. A car is such precisely because it is something with those connotations in public language 
and cannot be deemed as such without them. Likewise, to say that there can be a sensation 




If these objections are on point, they veer towards a particular answer regarding the target of the PLA. I 
argue that one of the chief conclusions of the PLA, specifically the remarks about sensation S, is the idea 
that many of the concepts that philosophers suppose to be established through the having of an 
experience and consequent naming of it are in fact the product of a far more complicated set of relations 
than assumed. A scenario truly devoid of anything barring the intrinsically felt experience or sensation is 
not so simple as we might at first admit. We inevitably impute into our considerations concepts that are 
not so privately established (as in the private ascription of colour or pain). And when we do try to imagine 
such logically private cases, cases without them, we are unable to meaningfully state how it is what we 
want to say it is in the first place. The real point of the PLA is to stress (‘remind’) that our understanding 
of concepts is had in virtue of their possessing a certain substantive content that constitutes what we 
mean by them. This point is emphasised by the failure of sensation S, which attempts to act as a sensation 
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concept stripped of all such content through which it might be understood. However, when such 
attempts at application lack content, it soon follows that judgements based on them are not just 
contentless, but also meaningless. This reasoning can be upheld without resorting to the idea that 




Metaphilosophy and methodology: 
 
To move on: In asking whether Wittgenstein should be read as committed to externalism, it is important 
to look outside the confines of the PLA. Considering the remarks:  
 
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its 
place. (PI §109) 
 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.―Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. (PI §126) 
 
If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, 
because everyone would agree to them. (PI §128) 
 
When philosophers use a word―“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, 
“name”―and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word 
ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home?― 
What we do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI §116) 
 
Remarks such as the above suggest something like the following: Wittgenstein’s ambitions were not to 
produce new philosophical theories expounding the real essence of knowledge, or the mind, or personal 
identity and so forth, but to dissolve confusions which have led philosophers to assume that finding such 
‘essences’ is a worthy philosophical ideal to aim for in the first place (PI §118-9). Such suppositions arise, 
Wittgenstein claims, from fundamentally misunderstanding how language works, and the therapeutic task 
Wittgenstein sets himself is to ‘bring words back’ to their everyday use, by reminding philosophers about 
the multifarious uses that constitute our applications of concepts and language, and from whence their 
original meaning is derived. Insofar as Wittgenstein has anything positive to say, it is trivial reminders 





What do these remarks have to do with the discussion about sensation concepts? Wittgenstein is advising 
that we recognise the multifarious ways in which such concepts can be applied, without trying to subsume 
them under one overarching theoretical framework. What is essential is that we as philosophers reflect 
(describe) the ways in which these concepts are used in our lives. To limit the use of sensation concepts 
to external circumstances or public checkability is almost inevitably going to be guilty of just the sort of 
exercise that Wittgenstein is condemning in these passages. 
 
Many commentators take a dim view of these metaphilosophical remarks. For instance, Kripke:  
 
Had Wittgenstein―contrary to his notorious and cryptic maxim of §128―stated the outcome 
of his conclusions in the form of definite theses, it would have been very difficult to avoid 
formulating his doctrines in a form that consists in apparent sceptical denials of our ordinary 
assertions (1982, p.69) 
 
Kripke clearly thinks we can separate Wittgenstein’s good philosophy, which is a sceptical denial of 
ordinary assertions, from his bad, from his ‘notorious and cryptic’ maxims.24 
 
Few Wittgensteinians seem prepared to stare straight into the mirror and say that Wittgenstein put 
forward no philosophical theses (see Fogelin, 2009, chapter 1, for good discussion). I am not entirely sure 
I can stare into that mirror myself.25 However, I do think the metaphilosophical remarks provide the 
necessary backdrop for how we should be thinking about other aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
They are not to be excised from an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s core ‘doctrines’ about rule-following 
and meaning. They are a functioning part of the machine.  
 
As discussed in Part III, Child draws externalist conclusions from the argument of the PLA. How does 
this fit with the metaphilosophy? On the face of it, they are in conflict; externalism, however you look at 
it, is a theory. It is not a trivial reminder, but a highly controversial philosophical theory of a quite 
traditional kind. As Child admits, the ‘natural appeal’ (2011, p.152) is towards the idea of concepts being 
meaningful according to their intrinsic character, not their exterior. In a discussion concerning 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical views and his philosophy of mathematics, Child thinks interpreters 
should bite the bullet and admit that Wittgenstein’s overall position is ‘genuinely conflicting’ (2011, 
p.134). The implication here is that this applies pari passu to his philosophy of psychology. 
 
                                                          
24 I assume PI §128 equally refers to surrounding remarks, as found in e.g. PI §§89-133. 
25 The most convincing attempt to do so that I have come across is Kuusela (2008). 
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I find this conclusion hard to believe. Biographically, that Philosophical Investigations was constructed over 
sixteen or so years, that it was the product of intense thought and energy, not to mention intensive 
revision and editing. Moreover Wittgenstein’s own passionate attachment to his metaphilosophical 
remarks belies the attribution of such glaring rudimentary inconsistency to his work. Even if the textual 
evidence were slim, much better, in my opinion, if we look for that evidence which gives the author the 
benefit of the doubt.  
 
In my view, Wittgenstein’s main concern was not to constrain concepts, but to criticise philosophers’ 
misappropriations of them. The aim of providing a surveyable representation is, to some extent, heuristic; 
it is a means to dispelling philosopher’s excessive generalisations of explanations that apply well under 
particular conditions. The mistake Wittgenstein attributes to philosophers, philosophers that would 
include externalists, is their concern to reduce our discourse to one unifying set of features. 
 
Rush Rhees neatly expresses a similar line of thinking: 
 
[Wittgenstein] would constantly describe ‘different ways of doing it’, but he did not 
call them different ways of saying the same thing. Nor did he think we could reach the 
heart of the matter by seeing what they all have in common. He did not see them as 
so many fumbling attempts to say what some of them ever does say perfectly. The 
variety is important – not in order to fix your gaze on the unadulterated form, but to 
keep you from looking for it. (1965, p.40) 
 
A proper understanding of the variety of ways in which our practices operate, including the vast amount 
of ways certain words are used in those practices, will lead us away from thinking that there is some 
uniquely identifying property or set of properties to which all uses must correspond: 
 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (§115) 
 
Recognition of the variety of uses of our concepts within such practices stops us from trying to provide 








If, as has been suggested, Wittgenstein was not opposed to sensation concepts untied to external 
circumstance, physiology, or behaviour then there is scope for retaining the original ‘natural’ intuition that 
a central feature of such concepts is how they feel intrinsically. I do not think we should shy away from this 
conclusion. In my view, one that is arguably at the least consonant with, if not emphasised by, 
Wittgenstein, is that it should be seen as part of the language-game that phenomenal concepts can be 
understood as concepts whose content is behaviourally, physiologically and circumstantially inaccessible 
to others, where ‘the feeling itself’ is what matters and can be conceptually divorced from any attendant 
extrinsicalities. This sort of privacy, in my view, is (trivially) acceptable, and recognisable as something 
one ‘plays by oneself’ (§248), and of which others ultimately cannot gain access to. Indeed, I recommend 
an even more radical position than this, arguing that such intuitions extend towards deeper conclusions 
than the relatively far-flung problems about Marianna, spectrum inversion, and zombies reveal. I want to 
suggest that the notion of ‘privacy’ discussed here plays a myriad of roles in our consciousness-ascribing 
practices. The privacy of phenomenal concepts is an important and central feature of our ordinary life. 
That we don’t have immediate access to others experiences, that they are not linked to any external 
circumstances, etc., is to be admitted. This is not something that philosophers should be aiming to refute 
or downplay. It is not precluded by the community’s inability to access it directly, or by a lack of 
connection with external behaviour. On the contrary, it is part of the ‘grammar’ of such a concept that its 
intrinsic features are, fundamentally, hidden from others. 
 
What I mean by privacy being part of our lives is that there are some aspects of our conscious lives that 
are unknown or unknowable to others. There is something essentially private to our experiences. In fact, I 
believe examples of this form of privacy express fairly deep aspects of personhood and the knowledge we 
possess of the conscious lives of those around us. Moreover, as discussed in my fourth response in Part 
II, there is often something it is like to be a certain kind of individual such that the experiences of that 
individual are not understandable by others who do not possess similar sentiments, or who do not come 
from similar enough backgrounds, lifestyles, or temperaments (etc.). (This is indeed even further 
emphasised when it comes to understanding the experiences of animals, and the sort of access we have to 
their conscious lives (see Nagel, 1986). We might also consider it in relation to our capacities and 
limitations for self-knowledge). By implication, there is something it is like for a particular conscious being 
to be the kind of conscious being that it is, this something can be entirely inaccessible, and yet this does 
not therefore render it logically private.  
 
I do not think that Wittgenstein would have been adamant that this might not be so, that we might not 




“What anyone says to himself within himself is hidden from me” might of course also mean 
that I can for the most part not guess it, nor can I read it off from, for example, the 
movement of his throat (which would be a possibility.) (PI, Part II, §xi, p.188) 
 
Moreover, we can appeal to a host of other remarks where Wittgenstein may be read as recognising a gap 
between pain and pain behaviour, e.g. PI §§278, 281, 291, 304, or between colour sensations and their 
external counterparts, e.g. PI §§276-8. Drawing from this idea, and attempting to develop it, we can go on 
to consider interesting cases from everyday life where this gap can be seen in operation. 
 
My view partly turns on arguing against a trend in philosophy which assumes that the possibility of not 
having such knowledge of others minds represents a puzzle that philosophers should seek to overcome. 
My basic starting point is that such 'knowledge' is more difficult to obtain than supposed, and that there 
are many ways in which understanding is limited (here I agree with Nagel (see his 1986, chapter 3). The 
position I argue against often appeals to examples where e.g. two people look at the same object, say a red 
ball, and try to show how we can 'know' that the other person sees the same (or similar) as we do. Or they 
appeal to other such very basic sensory-perceptual experiences. From my view, of course we should 
accept that we see the same (or similar) colours as others. My point is that when we start considering 
deeper facets of personhood― when we start talking about beliefs, about world-views, about morality, 
politics, social responsibility etc. etc. it is far more difficult to say that we can just 'see' the same things or 
understand how others think and feel. It is these facets which I think constitute in a much deeper way 
what it is like to be conscious, much deeper than simply 'seeing a red ball'. Contrast the life of Queen 
Elizabeth II with a Russian street sweeper, or that between a high-flying corporate lawyer and a 
committed Benedictine monk. Here (as I imagine it), there may be little understanding between these 
characters. It isn't just that they have different opinions, but that their starting points and life experiences 
are so far removed that they are unlikely to understand one another in much more than a basic sense. 
These examples, I suggest, represent an extreme of a phenomenon which affects our understanding of 
others in a more commonplace way. It suggests that knowledge of others minds is far more of a matter of 
degree, where we can often only approximate towards understanding, and sometimes fail miserably 
altogether. It suggests that there are limitations, sometimes insurmountable ones, based on great 
differences in values, temperaments, intelligence, politics, religion, or culture. There are physiological 
barriers, linguistic barriers, and conceptual barriers. In short, there are many ways in which our 
understanding is limited than is typically supposed by the ‘all or nothing’ manner of speaking which 
dominates discussion of knowledge of other minds between sceptics and their opponents. 
 
There is the flip-side to this, which is the extent to which people can understand each other. This is the 
more optimistic picture; with all the ways in which we can be separated mentally, culturally, emotionally 
etc. there are ways in which connections are made, where it makes sense to say that someone truly 
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understands us. People from totally different backgrounds can still forge perfectly meaningful 
understanding, even in the face of all these barriers; there is something to be said for recognising a shared 
human nature in this respect―the queen and the street sweeper 'could' form a wonderful bond. Even so, I 
still think that for the most part, the basic starting point and often the endpoint is failures in 
understanding. Perhaps that is what makes understanding such an achievement in the first place.  
 
Admittedly, these last speculations are fairly removed from concerns that Wittgenstein directly engaged 
in. However, I would like to think that they are consonant with them, and represent an interesting aspect 
of the notion of privacy. Unfortunately, a proper attempt at an ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ is beyond the 
bounds of this essay. The chief purpose is limited to hinting at how such considerations might serve as 
‘grammatical’ reminders, describing features of our conscious lives. In this way, I think non-logical privacy 
can be shown to play an important role in a full philosophy of psychology. 
 
 
At this point, we reach the terminus of the argument. If correct, the purpose has been to give a 
satisfactory account of phenomenal concepts from a Wittgensteinian perspective. During the course of 
which, I have been critical of much of the exegetical work to date, and seem to have put myself in 
opposition to many popularly defended lines of interpretation. I can only say that this is how I read 
Wittgenstein. One might say that at best I have provided reasons not to be a Wittgensteinian. Perhaps this 
is true. On the other hand, with more optimism, I like to think that I have defended a line of 
interpretation that accommodates for some of the more interesting puzzles that have been arising in 
philosophy of mind, especially during the last ten to twenty years. And with even more optimism, I have 
provided a way of thinking about the PLA which approximates to Wittgenstein’s true intentions, and 
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